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I. INTRODUCTIONS
EFTS-Electronic Funds Transfer systems-are a major evolu-
tionary leap in the development of the nation's payment processes.
Their introduction, already well underway, has raised and will con-
tinue to raise a wide array of serious, even novel, questions for the
legal order. Some of the issues are technical, going to such problems as
how electronic transfers can approximate the documenting function
of hard-copy checks and drafts, or to how the existing allocation of
payments risks can be retained with the new technology and the
opportunities it will create for losses, thefts, and abuse. These prob-
lems are difficult, interesting, and among the kinds that academic
legal research calls its own. EFTS also raises issues that are explicitly
policy-oriented or value-focused. Legal scholarship has traditionally
embraced these issues as well.
This Article is only tangentially about the legal and policy impli-
cations of EFTS. Its principal focus is legal scholarship-the intellec-
tual processes by which problems of both kinds are addressed. It offers
some critical observations about one particular genre of legal policy
analysis; more pointedly, it is a response to a single representative
instance of that analytical style-a book published in 1977 by Profes-
sors William Baxter, Paul Cootner, and Kenneth Scott. Their work
addressed the policy choices that EFTS will require the legal system to
make. This work addresses their work, neither to quarrel with their
conclusions nor to essay any particular set of legislative recommenda-
tions of its own, but rather to say something about how the internal
structure of a mode of ostensibly neutral scholarship defines, guides,
and takes its toll upon its subject.
This critique requires the setting of two stages: One is EFTS; the
other is the Baxter, Cootner and Scott report itself. Each will be
developed in greater detail throughout the Article; at this point, a
quick overview of both is necessary for the discussion that follows.
A. Electronic Funds Transfer Systems
EFTS is a collective term. Its range and meaning are not yet
fixed, though there is some general agreement as to what components
are likely to be present in any EFT system.1 Foregoing the technical
descriptions, EFTS is essentially the application of data processing
Descriptions of EFTS components more detailed than those given here appear in nu-
merous documents and reports. Two such are T. KLEINSCHMIT, ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER:
THE FuTuRE is Now (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Exponent No. 9, 1976); and H.
ScoTT, NEW PAYMENT SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMITTEE OF THE PERMANENT EDITO-
RIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5-30 (1978).
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and communication technologies to effect those transfers of funds that
are now accomplished through the use of cash, check, and other
hard-copy payment methods. Large-scale computerization, with cen-
tral mainframes and widely placed remote access terminals, plays a
powerful central role. Equally important to putative policy analysts is
the system or integrating aspect of the technology: EFTS portends a
far-reaching network of communicating computers, tying together
numerous payees, payors, and systems managers in a large and poten-
tially ubiquitous matrix of processed data-hence the possibility that
EFTS can do new things fast, not just old things faster.
At the present time most EFTS planning includes four major
subsystems besides the proliferating genus of now familiar Automated
Teller Machines (ATM's). One, already well in place, is the Auto-
mated Clearing House (ACH). In the case of an ordinary (pre-EFTS)
checking account, the information necessary to effect a transfer of
funds from a payor's demand deposit account to a payee's commercial
account is captured on a piece of paper-the check. The paper is sent
from the payor to the payee, from the payee to the payee's depository
institution, then through a series of intermediary banks back to the
payor's depository bank which completes the circle by returning the
item to the payor. Each player abstracts from the paper the informa-
tion necessary to effect the transfer, simultaneously causing payment
to be made on the underlying transaction.
An Automated Clearing House is the central actor in a somewhat
different and far less costly system. Checks are replaced by magnetic
images on a reel of computer tape. A payor- a consumer, for exam-
ple, wishing to pay a retail store's bill-informs his bank that the
payment should be made, and of its amount. The bank encodes the
instruction into electronic signals. It forwards them over a regional
communications network to the banking institution holding the ac-
count of the intended payee. The recipient institution informs the
payee that the transfer has been credited. Once again the payment
and the conveyance of the necessary information are simultaneous,
but in an ACH system the circular paper flow and handling have been
replaced by the transmission of weightless electronic impulses. The
ACH itself is the network's switch. It sits at the center of the web of
payees' and payors' banks.
One potential use of an ACH system is Direct Deposit of Payroll
(DDP), the second of the four major EFTS components. DDP is also
currently available and in use by some significant credit issuers. It
involves a payor, such as the Social Security Administration or an
industrial employer, sending to its bank a magnetic tape on which it
has encoded all of the information necessary for the distribution of its
payments. That bank makes the gross deduction from the issuer's
1981]
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account and forwards over the ACH wire the payee information it has
received. The ACH sorts and divides the information and transmits it
to the several recipient institutions, each of which credits to the
account of the intended payee the described amount. Paper checks
and their circular flow are entirely avoided, as is the physical han-
dling of the deposit by the individual recipient.
Pre-Authorized Debiting (PAD) is the third complementary com-
ponent. In PAD, individuals are the credit issuers. But rather than
operate on consumer-instigated transfers, in a PAD system the indi-
vidual gives a blanket authorization to an EFT systems manager to
pay recurring obligations periodically. A household might for example
pay its electric utility bills simply by doing nothing-or at most very
little-each month. Its account would be debited automatically at the
call of the utility company-an instruction to the ACH that in effect
says: "Pay me the following amounts from the following account
numbers." Notification of the deduction is then made to the payor by
its own bank. There are several variations on the PAD theme: Some
would require the specific consent of the payor to each transfer; some
would permit specified exceptions; others would have even more com-
plex authority and reversal protocols. The central theme of PAD is
nevertheless constant-the debiting of householders' accounts at the
instigation of a putative payee.
The fourth major EFTS subsystem is Point of Sale debiting
(POS). POS is not yet widely developed, though a number of pilot
projects have been staged. In a POS system a purchaser of goods
presents to the retailer, at the time of purchase, a plastic card magnet-
ically encoded with information about the consumer's account. This
information is added by the "cash register" to the information con-
cerning the specific sale. The cash register, actually a communicating
computer terminal, transmits the data to the central EFTS network.
The result is a virtually instantaneous debit from the account of the
consumer and a credit to the account of the retailer. Other informa-
tion concerning the transaction, including retail sale data not strictly
necessary to effect the payment, is relatively easy for POS equipment
to capture at the point of sale. The additional data might be transmit-
ted forward through the switching network for processing, or it might
be recorded simultaneously and retained by the merchant for later
analysis.
The social and legal issues that these four EFTS processes can
generate are legion. Some have already become the subject of protect-
ive federal legislation. 2 The Federal Executive has appointed a Na-
2 See Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (Supp. III 1979)); note 29 infra.
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tional Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer Systems 3 and the
American Law Institute/National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has formed its own review committee to analyze
those sections of Articles three and four of the Uniform Commercial
Code that will be affected by an implementation of electronic pay-
ment systems.4 The National Science Foundation has commissioned a
weighty study; 5 the Atlanta Payments Project has produced two six-
volume reports6 sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and coordi-
nated by the Georgia Institute of Technology. The related legal litera-
ture can be measured in pounds. EFTS has been a matter of
widespread concern.
B. The Baxter, Cootner and Scott Report
Professors Baxter, Cootner and Scott are far more sanguine about
EFTS and its future than any of its other numerous analysts. 7 EFTS,
they suggest, is not a qualitative break with the past. Within the
history of payments processes, the move to EFTS will be less of a
perturbation than have been other prior systemic transitions- includ-
ing the rise of demand deposit banking itself. Throughout that history
no technology has ever precipitously replaced its predecessor; changes,
spawned and modulated by shifts in underlying cost structures, have
taken place gradually. For this and other reasons, Baxter, Cootner
and Scott conclude that EFTS poses no new problems-other, per-
haps, than a new temptation for government to regulate the payments
industry.8
3 The Commission, hereafter NCEFT, was created by Congress and appointed by the
President on October 28, 1974. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 201, 88 Stat. 1500
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976)). It has published two reports-EFT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (February 1977), and EFT IN THE UNITED STATES (October 1977)-in addition to
numerous working papers. [The February 1977 report will be referred to hereinafter as NCEFT
INTERIM; the October report as NCEFT FINAL.
' The principal product thus far is the report to the committee. H. SCOTT, NEW PAYMENT
SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMITTEE OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1978).
1 A.D. LITrLE, INC., THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NSF/RANN (National Science Foundation/Research Applied to National Needs)].
' GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ATLANTA PAYMENTS PROJECT, RESEARCH ON IMPROVE-
MENTS OF THE PAYMENTS MECHANISM: PHASE III, GENERAL SYSYEMS DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF AN
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM (1972) [hereinafter cited as APP/GIT PHASE III].
1 Baxter, Cootner & Scott's own summary of their work appears in BC&S at 173-81.
S Id. at 3-13.
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The Baxter, Cootner and Scott report sees the impetus for EFTS
coming largely from alterations in two contexts: the economic conse-
quence of advances in the technology of computing and communica-
tions, and the increasing opportunity costs of individuals' time result-
ing from the rise of personal incomes. Given the economic and legal
structures of retail banking, EFTS is a logical response of the banking
industry to these patterns of changing costs.
When an individual consumes a unit of banking service, two
kinds of costs are incurred. One is the bank's cost to produce the
service; the other is the individual's cost to consume it.9 How EFT
systems can reduce the former is obvious. The latter cost Baxter,
Cootner and Scott measure by the value of consumers' time.' 0 Finan-
cial transactions- depositing funds, drawing checks, reconciling ac-
counts and the like-cost consumers their time. Time is money.
Demand deposit customers are, by law, undercompensated for
their deposit balances. (That's why banks like to have them.) The
inability of banks to pay free-market rates on deposit balances has an
interesting price-discrimination result. In effect, banks charge differ-
ent amounts of foregone interest to customers who value pro-
pinquity- reduction of banking access costs-differently. Each cus-
tomer will try to maintain an account balance at a level such that the
cost of another dollar in deposits, measured in terms of the foregone
opportunity of investing that dollar, is just equal to the marginal
access or transaction cost which the deposit will save: large, infre-
quent deposits have higher investment loss but lower transaction costs
per dollar transferred. Customers with high time costs therefore main-
tain larger undercompensated balances."
Because banks cannot compete for customers on the basis of
prices paid for deposits, they must compete by reducing their cus-
tomers' transaction costs. The result is the proliferation of branches
and remote access devices such as ATM's. Offering propinquity is a
competitive strategy made necessary by increases in this undercom-
pensation of customers' deposit balances, which is in turn a function
of changes in general market interest rates. Therefore, with cus-
tomers' personal incomes and interest rates on loans both at historic
highs, and computation/communication costs at historic lows, con-
sumers will demand and banks will provide EFT systems, to reduce
the net personal and social costs of effecting payments. 2
9 Id. at 16-17.
1o Id. at 25.
" Id. at 26-27. A large balance will reduce the frequency of deposit making, hence reduce
time costs at the expense of increased investment opportunity costs. See note 34 infra.
"2 Id. at 31-34.
[Vol. 2:397
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A similar analysis holds, according to Baxter, Cootner and Scott,
for the use of casual retail credit: high time-cost consumers will try to
reduce banking and shopping time. This can be done partly by charg-
ing purchases. Retail stores thus offer charge accounts to attract those
customers who do not invest much search time in shopping for bar-
gains and who will therefore pay higher prices-again, the high
time-cost customer. POS debit cards function as charge accounts.
They reduce in several ways the costs of purchasing goods and making
payments. They should therefore be increasingly attractive to con-
sumers with increasingly positive time opportunity costs, and to the
retailers who serve them. 1 3
Generally speaking, an individual's choice among payment
methods (check, credit card, POS/debit card) will be informed by
how well each method can minimize the time and other costs required
to effect a payment. Because the several components of EFTS respond
precisely to the economizing motivations of consumers, to the efforts
of banks to reduce their own payment-processing costs, and to mer-
chants' efforts to attract customers, "a very large market for the new
technology will develop very quickly."' 4
This syllogism is Baxter, Cootner and Scott's first major point. It
stands at the foundation of their analysis. Actually, it is two points,
both of which will be analyzed in detail in later sections of this
Article: the first is that an individual's commercial behavior can be
explained by supposing that consumers always seek to reduce the costs
of their activities; that time devoted to shopping and paying is a cost;
and that the cost of time needed to make payments is accurately
measured by the income which working time could otherwise pro-
vide.' 5 The second point is that since EFTS is a response to the
demands of consumers, banks, and merchants, it will be installed
because of and in conformity with-not in spite of-consumer
choice. 16
Baxter, Cootner and Scott recognize that others have foreseen
problems in the rapid implementation of EFTS, but deny that any
reasonable version of its implementation would be a kink in banking's
world-line. In their view, the critical policy issues raised by EFTS are
primarily issues of structure: branching, interstate operations, me-
chanics of cooperation and net interactions. One overriding issue is
, Id. at 36-48.
I d. at 69.
, See discussion at pages 408-19 infra.
10 See discussion at pages 453-64 infra.
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the misguided temptation of public regulators to overreact-to see,
for example, EFT systems as natural monopolies and to legislate
accordingly. 17
On the issue of monopolization Baxter, Cootner and Scott agree
that because EFTS is a communication device, it will require signifi-
cant cooperation among participants in the payments industry. They
maintain, however, that the cooperation required can be of a kind
consistent with the norms of antitrust policy: the full utilization of
scale economies offered by EFT systems will not cause such concentra-
tion in the industry as to impair the advantages of adequate competi-
tion. 1 8 Calculating both costs and scale economies, Baxter, Cootner
and Scott offer a "conservative prediction" of the number of intercon-
nected EFTS nets that could coexist nationwide-forty at the least.
They conclude that EFTS nets are therefore not likely to become
monopolies in need of regulation. But because in many states there
cannot be intrastate rivalry if interstate banking operations are pro-
scribed, present legal restrictions on interstate banking must be re-
moved if EFTS is to develop into a fully competitive system. 9
As to the threat that EFTS poses to the values of privacy, a threat
that other commentators see as inherent in EFTS' on-line ability to
capture and process enormous stores of data about individuals' finan-
cial transactions,20 Baxter, Cootner and Scott conclude that "[t]he
privacy problem ...[i]n its rather minor EFTS dimension . . . is one
of the simpler issues, in terms of analysis if not necessarily of emo-
tion." EFTS, again, poses no new issues. The degree of privacy that
users of the payments process now enjoy is an artifact of the high costs
of snooping-of recording, organizing and keeping available data
about individuals' financial affairs. Although computerization of the
payments process through EFTS will, they concede, reduce those
costs, the price of data storage and retrieval will "remain an operative
and often prohibitive constraint. '22 Moreover, since EFTS nets will
overlap, net managers will be constrained to compete for all of the
17 See BC&S at 142-43. Baxter, Cootner & Scott offer the opinion that applying the concept
of branching to ATM's, for example, would produce nothing but "absurdities," id. at 125, and
that to prevent unrestricted branching of POS and ATM would be "disastrous." Id. at 126.
("ATM" means free standing Automated Teller Machines at locations other than inside existing
branches.)
IR Id. at 75-76.
'9 Id. at 101-14.
10 See, e.g., J. RULE, VALUE CHOICE IN ELECrRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER POLICY 32, 57-58 (1975)
(Report to the Office of Telecommunications Policy, Washington, D.C.); sources cited in BC&S
at 162.
21 BC&S at 173.
22 Id. at 162.
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"goods" demanded by consumers. Thus, according to Baxter, Cootner
and Scott, the degree of privacy offered-a good to some if a cost to
others-will be optimal in the absence of unnecessary legislative con-
straints. Finally, EFTS will always be an option rather than a ubiqui-
tous and exclusive mode of payment. 23
Authorized access to account data is not a serious problem in
Baxter, Cootner and Scott's view; only misunderstandings are trouble-
some, and they can easily be avoided with adequate disclosure of the
terms of the account.2 4 Unauthorized access is a problem, but the
party to fear in this regard is not the net operator: "Only the Govern-
ment could create the monolithic control machine of Justice Douglas'
dissent [in California Bankers Association v. Schultz25 ] or of Orwell's
1984, and whether or not it does so will hardly depend on whether
EFTS is used for bill paying."2
All in all, say they, "[tihe benefits to consumers from unfettered
development, of EFTS in banking far outweigh [its] associated
risks ..... 27
II. A CRITIQUE: PRELIMINARIES
It is an elementary political reality that public institutions are
more easily shaped at birth than remolded later. The present is there-
fore a critical time for EFTS and the future of consumer financial
systems; serious policy-directed studies are both timely and necessary.
The Baxter, Cootner and Scott volume purports to be one. It is a
rigorous, well crafted and exemplary instance of an important genre
of policy analysis. Yet it neglects to consider significant dimensions of
the problems raised by EFTS, or to see law as relevant to them. It is,
in ways yet to be noted, elegant but curiously unsatisfying. The most
interesting question to the legal scholar, if not to the industry analyst,
is why and how it turned out that way.
The following pages will explore that question on two major
fronts. The first will be a close scrutiny of the behavioral predicates of
the Baxter, Cootner and Scott model. As has already been seen, there
lies at the heart of their methodology a set of assumptions about
consumer behavior that leads, perhaps inexorably, to a narrowed
appreciation of the kinds of problems that EFTS is likely to pose for
23 Id. at 167.
24 Baxter, Cootner & Scott imply, though they do not say so explicitly, that competition will
result in optimal disclosure as well. Id. at 165. Congress has disagreed; the EFTS Act and
Regulation E are addressed precisely to regulatory attention to the problem of disclosure. See
note 29 infra.
25 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974).
26 BC&S at 166.
27 Id. at 181.
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the consuming public. The second front is related to the first: Baxter
and company end-and begin-with a predisposition against govern-
mental regulation of consumer service institutions. Even when they do
recognize a problem in the coming of EFTS they eschew public
intervention, arguing instead that optimal solutions are likely to
emerge only through the guidance of unfettered market forces. There
is an equilibrium between the two ideas: consumers behave so as to
maximize their economic interests, and markets work because they
are disciplined by consumers acting on their preferences. The conclu-
sion is inevitable: because every legitimate consumer issue that EFTS
can raise will result in an expression of a consequent disciplinary force
fueled by consumer preferences, marketplace solutions are most likely
to be the correct ones.
Both assumptions of the Baxter, Cootner and Scott model, and
the connection between them, will be examined. Each, to presage the
conclusion, will be found wanting. The point, again, is a method-
ological criticism, with EFTS as its case study-an inquiry into how
the emptiness of the conclusions can be traced to the flaws in the
method.
One discrete point deserves mention at the outset, however, as it
is important to the substance, as well as the method, of the Baxter,
Cootner and Scott analysis. Their report focused on POS (Point-of-
Sale debiting) and ATM (Automated Teller Machines), to the near-to-
tal exclusion of ACH (Automated Clearing Houses). This omission
was most unfortunate and ill-advised. For one thing, ACH's will very
probably be the central switches of most EFT systems. It is, for
example, widely agreed that full EFTS implementation will have
DDP and PAD among its major components; it is through ACH's that
such features will be coordinated. Though it is possible to envision a
future of ATM and POS without ACH, it seems unlikely, or at least so
unlikely that a study of EFTS without it is a bit strange.
Secondly, it is abundantly clear that the fabric of interbank
clearing operations has significant effects on both customer-bank rela-
tionships and those between customers and payees. 28 ACH, that is to
say, raises a plethora of consumer issues. 29
8 Consider, for example, the ordinary case of a sale of goods paid for by check, which goods
the buyer finds defective on delivery. Though payment by check does not waive the buyer's right
to instigate an action for breach of warranty, see U.C.C. § 2-607(2), the right of vindication is
less important as a practical matter than the procedure by which it is effected. Buyer issues a
stop-payment order. Whether the order is timely depends upon whether the payor bank has
completed the process of posting, id. § 4-303(1)(d), or has otherwise become accountable by the
passage of time, id. § 4-303(1)(e). The process of posting is completed whenever the bank has
done all of its usual posting routine, id. § 4-109; see West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank,
[Vol. 2:397
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The report focused on branching and similar structural problems
that are threatened by the existing web of government regulation. It
failed to address seriously such "retail" questions as rights of charge-
back; application of transaction defenses to the bank-customer nexus;
liabilities for thefts and gaffes, computer errors and human excesses;
and amendment of the not-quite-yet archaic laws of setoff and gar-
nishment. Had an analysis of ACH been featured in the discussion, a
focus on these other matters would have been all but unavoidable. 30
The elision of ACH and of the consumer issues that EFTS in general
raises is mystifying. Perhaps these problems were too technical for a
policy-directed study; perhaps they were made invisible by the au-
thors' sanguine view of EFTS as evolution-on-demand; perhaps, on
the other hand, the self-sealing analytical nature of the methodology
37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968); the "otherwise accountable" period is established by,
inter alia, "clearing-house rule or agreement." U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(d) (This is an instance of the
general rule that customers are bound by "operating letters, clearing house rules, and the like
... whether or not specifically assented to .... " Id. § 4-103(2).).
Another example, using the same simple hypothetical case, involves a buyer in a state far
from the seller's, who seeks to obtain in rem jurisdiction over the defaulting seller by moving
against the check or its proceeds in the hands of a paying or correspondent bank. Whether he can
do so depends upon who "owns" the item, and that is determined by the custom of the depository
bank in allowing or not allowing its depositors to draw against uncollected funds. See U.C.C. §
4-201(1), 4-208(1), 4-209; Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 P.
869 (1920).
" Many of these concerns have been addressed by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, §§ 901-920, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (Supp. III
1979)). The Act amends and becomes Title IX of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). It sets out
mandatory disclosures for EFTS users, § 905, including a description of (but not a limit on) the
circumstances under which the institution will disclose account information. The Act also
addresses issues of error resolution, § 908; unauthorized transfers, § 909; "tie-in" sales of EFTS
and other credit services, § 913; and a variety of other matters.
Regulations implementing the Act became effective during 1980. The regs (Federal Res.
Board Regulation E) are at 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1980).
'o At the time the report was written in 1977, moreover, the ACH system was fairly well in
place, and undoubtedly generating data about itself that might have been helpful in verifying
certain aspects of the analysis.
One hypothesis to explain the absence of ACH-work might be that the report itself was
commissioned research, as its authors clearly acknowledged. ("The study was originally under-
taken at the instance of and with financial support from Citicorp, which wished an outside and
completely independent appraisal of a field in which it was making large investments." Preface
to BC&S at vi.) ACH is pretty well in place. Though there is the residual issue of ownership,
private versus public, ACH is not a hotly fought regulatory problem for any single private bank.
Basically, the Fed is paying for it. This may also explain the absence of discussion in the report of
other "consumer" issues-the sponsor, contemplating a multimegadollar hardware investment,
may well have thought the structural issues to be more pressing and in need of outside commen-
tary.
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they employed did not identify a need for empirical validation, or for
the investigation of problems that the constructs did not illuminate.
Criticizing a piece of scholarship by pointing out that it em-
braced only some of the issues implied by its subject is usually unfair.
It is appropriate in the present case only because the report itself
claims a comprehensive jurisdiction: "issues that will hold the most
significance for the consuming public ...over the next five to ten
years. "31 The judgment proposed is equally global: "[W]e conclude
that the introduction of electronic technology will be unequivocally
advantageous to consumers in terms of time and money." 32  And,
therefore, "there is no question that EFTS services are socially desir-
able .... .33
III. Homo ECONOMICUS: TESTING THE MODEL
At the heart of the analysis Baxter, Cootner and Scott have
postulated a model of consumer behavior that forms the lynchpin of
their apparatus. The model supposes that consumers will act to econo-
mize costs and maximize benefits; that all relevant consumer values
may be translated into a single currency; and that what is best for
consumers may be determined by tracing and summing the ebbs and
flows of this currency. The sterility of the model is patent. The section
next following will offer some thoughts about components of human
behavior that the model ignores; the present section focuses on the
model from a more critical perspective. Later we shall see that the
model is narrow. Here, we shall see that it is wrong.
A. EFTS and the Economic Man
It is not difficult to detect the seeds of Baxter, Cootner and Scott's
ultimate conclusion that EFTS is good in the elaboration of their
behavioral assumptions. To review briefly, the assumptions are these:
effecting transactions, particularly payments, is time-consuming and
costly. The cost to consumers of effecting such transactions can be
measured largely by the opportunity cost of consumers' time, a num-
ber which varies positively with personal income. Managers of private
payments systems thus compete to provide propinquity in the form of
transaction-time-saving conveniences, and are paid for this propin-
quity by attracting consumers' undercompensated deposit bal-
l' BC&S at v.
32 Id. at 65.
33 Id.
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ances. 34 The total social cost of the payments process is the sum of the
banks' cost to deliver propinquity plus the customers' remaining costs
to effectuate payment. Whatever reduces one or both thereby reduces
net social cost and is, a fortiori, a desirable change. Devices such as
POS and PAD reduce the net social cost of the payments process by
automating in-bank operations and by reducing the time required of
consumers to effect payments.3 5
Central to this model are the assertions that bank customers
differ in their access costs "primarily because of differences in their
opportunity costs of time, 3 and that these differences correlate
"strongly and positively" with the customer's income. The measure of
this opportunity cost is the value of returns to labor, or income earned
per unit of time in the working day. A worker with a salary of $20,000
therefore has an opportunity cost, for each minute spent effecting
payments, of $0.18; for a blue-collar worker the same time is worth
$0.075. The opportunity cost of time for a single person is usually
higher than that for a family taken as a whole and, within a family,
"it is usually true that the family member taking care of the home has
a lower opportunity cost of time. ' 37
This method of calculation, if it makes any sense at all, does so
only within a theoretical universe where units of labor are infinitely
divisible and discretely exchangeable at will, and wages are the only
relevant form of income. In the real world it is often the case that the
value of a homemaker's time is very much higher than that of a wage
earner-that for the wage earner to lose ten minutes of wages is less
costly than for the homemaker to lose ten minutes of time otherwise
spent on maintenance services that could be priced, in the market,
well above the working spouse's ten minute income. And even then
we have assumed that the wage rate is the appropriate opportunity-
cost scale for the wage-earner's nonworking time and/or that effecting
payments will be done instead of working, rather than instead of
drinking beer.
These assumptions are quite unfounded. Indeed, one could make
a case for just the contrary of the proposition that the value of time
will covary positively with personal income. Consider the extreme
case of a person who, to hold a job at all, must work a seventy hour
" If the size of the balance varies, the amount of undercompensation varies; hence a
differential price for banking services-higher for those with higher balances, lower for those
with time costs low enough to justify the transacting that deposits-just-enough-to-cover-expenses
requires. See note 11 supra.
35 And, therefore, EFTS is a desirable social change. See BC&S at 65.
36 Id. at 25.
31 Id. at 70 n.7.
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week. Compare him to one whose job occupies only thirty-five hours.
The latter has thirty-five hours more leisure time than the former.38
Thus, even if his income per hour is triple that of his busier counter-
part, it is still possible that the opportunity cost of a minute of non-
working time is far greater for the seventy hour worker than for one
who works half as long and earns more. All this says is that the
relevant cost-opportunities may be leisure rather than work, and that
because hours of work are generally not discretionary, the hourly
return to working is a very poor measure of the time cost of consum-
ing. It is true that expenditures of time do have some cost to everyone.
It is not that this psychology is incurably flawed; it is just grossly
incomplete. Time is costly, but there is no reason to believe that it is
properly measured by cash returns to labor, or that people will believe
and behave as if it were.
That points up the most significant observation thus far: the
truth of the proposition-that because something reduces the net costs
of an activity like banking and making payments it is "advantageous
to consumers" and therefore "socially desirable"-is dependent upon
the accuracy of the underlying cost calculations. If the analyst's cost
schedules do not accurately reflect the consumers' schedules, for what-
ever reason, the conclusion that EFTS reduces costs as they are per-
ceived by consumers is very likely to be wrong. If the schedules are far
enough out of sync, what the miscalculating analyst sees as a lowered
cost the public may see as an increase. The social desirability of a
change like EFTS is therefore sensitively dependent upon the aptness
of the behavioral assumptions that its analysts bring to bear.
B. Checking Predictions
There is in both the physical and the social sciences a consensus
about how to deal with models such as this one. A model is a heuristic
convenience, a conceptual picture of something- atomic structure,
planetary motion, consumer behavior-fashioned to explain as many
of the collected observations as possible. A model becomes compli-
cated, like Ptolemy's epicycles, when further observations stubbornly
refuse to conform to what the model would require. A model fails
3 One could question which is the special case and which the general. Baxter, Cootner &
Scott seem to assume that work hours are, in small units, discretionary, so that one's "consump-
tion" of leisure is measured by the foregone return to the foregone marginal unit of labor. That, I
fear, is the special case. It is more often true that work-i.e., earning-hours are not discretion-
ary to any great degree. And, when that is so, leisure time has its own quite independent value.
Moreover, leisure is not necessarily consumed by, e.g., banking, which could even be quite
satisfying and therefore of positive rather than negative value.
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when the rationalizations become either trivial or impossible and the
collected anomalies can no longer be resisted.3 9  Along the way,
scientific thinking uses the model as a working hypothesis, always
subject to testing and ready to be revised or discarded if falsified. 40
The standard method of testing a model, be it economic or
astronomic, is to generate and then attempt to falsify its predictions.
The content of the predictions need not themselves be substantively
interesting; their use is to validate the model that spawned them. The
model of General Relativity, for example, implied the curvature of
space in the presence of gravitational fields. That suggested the pre-
diction that light from a star should be bent as it passes by the Sun on
its way to Earth, causing an apparent displacement in the star's
position. The prediction was tested. It worked. The existence of the
predicted effect was secondary to what its verification implied for the
accuracy of the model itself.
It seems appropriate to subject the Baxter, Cootner and Scott
model to an analogous regimen. The model postulates a specific the-
ory of behavioral motivation as a way to describe and understand
consumer preferences. Thus it should generate empirically verifiable
predictions about consumer behavior-predictions which are useful
not for their own sake, but because they permit assessment of the
model that spawned them. The authors' discussion itself suggested five
testable propositions. The test results are interesting: One prediction
was inconclusively though possibly confirmed; one was falsified weak-
ly; and three were strongly falsified to varying degrees. The following
discussion takes them up in that order.
1. Because credit card use saves time (otherwise spent on writing
checks, making deposits, reconciling accounts) as compared to the use
of checks, among the population as a whole credit card users should
be those whose time costs are higher than are those of nonusers.4' All
other things being equal, the credit card/check ratio should therefore
vary positively with income, since those with higher income will
behave as if they had higher time costs.42
It is this prediction for which the test was inconclusive. Credit
card use in absolute terms does indeed vary positively with income.
But so does the number, if not the usage, of checking accounts main-
" An extraordinarily well documented example in the physical sciences is discussed in T.
KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION (1957). A more comprehensive work by the same author is
T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
40 This is part of what Kuhn refers to as "normal science." See generally T. KUHN, THE
COPNERICAN REVOLUTION (1957).
4, BC&S at 47, 51-53.
41 See id. at 29, 39.
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tained. 43  There are, moreover, some important caveats to what
seems at first to be a substantial verification. One is the possibility that
the effect of higher absolute usage of bank credit cards among higher
income individuals can be explained by a rival and equally plausible
hypothesis: people cannot use credit cards they do not have. The
availability of credit cards, especially bank cards, varies among in-
come groups largely as a result of suppliers' choices as expressed
through demographically stratified marketing efforts and internal
credit-risk policies. 44
Related data intensify the ambiguity of the correlation. As to
credit cards issued by retail stores, Lewis Mandell's empirical investi-
gations show that card use increases distinctly with income only
through the middle ranges (up to $15,000). Between $15,000 and
$20,000 use increases "only slightly" and then actually declines among
higher income individuals. 45 That seems, again at face value, to be
inconsistent with the time-cost hypothesis.
A third point goes to the nub of the prediction, that is, to the
suggestion that the income/use correlation is attributable to the mea-
surement of transaction costs in terms of the opportunity cost of time.
Generally speaking, and except for the very highest income groups,
"[c]redit card users view their cards more as debt instruments than as
mechanisms for facilitating transactions. '46  This is reinforced by
another of Mandell's tabulations: his survey questionnaire asked its
subjects to indicate which of several attributes pertained to credit
cards. The results, expressed as the percentage of all families in given
41 F. INGRAM & 0. PucH, FINANCIAL SERVICES: HOUSEHOLD ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES, A
CONSUMER PANEL APPROACH 9 (1977) (University of South Carolina, Occasional Study No. 12),
offers the following tabulation:
Percentage of families
with DDA's at two or
Household Income more banks





44 L. MANDELL, CREDIT CARD USE IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (1972).
45 Id. at 22, 26. That decline at the highest range holds for gasoline cards and, in an even
more pronounced way, for bank cards. "Travel and entertainment" card use, however, increases
rapidly as incomes rise, as might be expected from the credit qualifications and demography of
the T&E card user base. See id. at 25, Chart 2-3.
" Id. at 7. The highest income group into which respondents were placed was $25,000 per
annum. Id. at 46. (The surveys were done in 1970 and 1971.)
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income ranges who mentioned particular attributes, 47 are interesting:
Convenient; better Can buy now
Family Income than checks without the cash







Over $25,000 24 19
While the measure of convenience does rise, it does not do so as
smoothly as the model would predict. The very highest group actually
showed a decline. The "buy now pay later" measure stayed fairly
constant, and in frequency was at least as strong as the convenience
feature in every range except, again, the highest. This tends to support
both rival hypotheses equally well. 48  And, although Baxter, Cootner
and Scott did not quantify their observations, one might have ex-
pected from their model to see a higher absolute value for the conven-
ience measure in the upper income strata.
These several factors, among others,49 cast doubt on the matter.
Though each may make his own assessment, this point seems to lie
somewhere between a weak confirmation and a draw.
Id. Multiple responses were allowed.
s The constancy of the credit advantage explains the use/income correlation if we assume
that suppliers issue cards differentially to different credit-risk persons.
4' T. DUUN & C. ELLIEHAUSEN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY (sponsored by Office of
Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), adds some further details. As indicated there, over
70% of all card users retain most of their transaction receipts for purposes of accounting or
tracking spending. The Baxter, Cootner & Scott model would suggest that retention of the slips
might decline with income (as the time cost of accounting would rise). It doesn't seem to, except
at the lowest extreme. The upper-income group had a higher slip-retention rate than did those in
the next-highest range:
Keep Credit Card Slips
Income Most of the Time Never
Percent Percent
Under $7,500 78.0 6.3
$7,500-12,499 71.2 9.1
$12,500-17,499 65.2 9.0
Over $17,500 69.1 10.1
Id. at 42, Table 8-2.
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2. Within a given income class, users of credit cards will tend to
be those with higher aversions to the tasks of accounting for balances,
of budgeting and of careful shopping. That those who do have cards
are those who have decided to exercise, for whatever reason, less care
is suggested by the frequency with which non-card-holding house-
holds quote a fear of slipping into wasteful shopping habits as the
reason for their decision not to use cards . 50
The data from Mandell tell a different story. His survey inquired
about attitudes toward credit cards among both users and nonusers.
Respondents listed what were to them the salient attributes; Mandell
correlated these lists with other variables to see how attitudes might
covary. One of the attributes was, "Credit cards cause one to buy
more than is necessary." When the frequency of citation was cross-
tabulated with actual use, Mandell found this:5'
Percentage of respondents
who cite this problem as
Respondents an attribute of credit cards
(a) Use at least one card 78
(b) Don't use cards 72
(c) Use bank cards 78
(d) Use cards but not bank cards 78
The differences, while not terribly large, lie in a direction oppo-
site to the Baxter, Cootner and Scott's prediction, according to which
one would have expected to see those who do not use cards citing this
attribute more often than those who do use them .52 There may be a
bit of a learning effect going on, with card users discovering things
that nonusers would not so readily know. The falsification is neverthe-
less there: Baxter, Cootner and Scott's generally rationalistic model
would predict that as users learn of this attribute, they will remain
users only if they are not averse to "wasteful shopping habits" and will
become nonusers if they are. Thus, even assuming a learning effect,
BC&S at 40, 48 n.3. The relationship between these suppositions and the central theory is
made explicit, id. at 47 (high income customers have high time costs thus high search costs thus
spend less time shopping effectively). See generally id. at 26.
51 L. MANDELL, supra note 44, at 39.
52 With a similar attribute-"Hard to tell what is spent"-card-using families agreed twice
as often as did nonusing families. The rate went from 1% to 2%, perhaps not a statistically
significant difference. Id. at 51. (This and the attribute discussed in the text were two of eight
possible categories into which the survey responses were coded.)
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the prediction is not supported by the data. Users cite this "fear" more
often than do nonusers. Unless we know why those users used the
cards anyway, it is difficult to place much confidence in the assertion
that nonusers' aversions to "wasteful shopping habits" indicate that
card users are those with higher aversions to careful, time-consuming
shopping. The attitude responses are consistent neither with the pre-
diction that card use within income groups rests upon aversions to the
time and effort involved in accounting for balances, for budgeting,
and for careful shopping, 53 nor with the description of these as con-
sumer-motivating costs.
3. Because "the opportunity cost of time of the single person is
usually, in fact, higher than that of the family," "single persons
appear to use [credit] cards [a payments mechanism of low time cost
compared to cash and, especially, checks] to a greater degree than
families with the same income. ... 54
53 Other data, more recent than Mandell's, also support the falsification. For one, credit card
users as a class do seem to be interested in recording and reconciling accounts. In response to a
question in a 1977 survey, "the majority (70.0 per cent) indicated that they saved their credit-
card receipts for comparison with billing statements. Only 9.6 per cent responded that they did
not keep slips." 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 49, at 39, 42.
Another survey demonstrated a similar attitude-respondents were asked to rank a list of
credit card features on a scale of importance to them. 34 % of the respondents ranked as "very
important" (the highest category) the fact that credit card receipts helped one to keep track of
what has been spent. F. INGRAM & 0. PUGH, supra note 43, at 58.
Finally, and though not a part of this prediction as it has been stated, it is interesting to see
how this aversion varies across income groups rather than within them. Baxter, Cootner & Scott
might for example have suggested that as incomes, hence time-costs, rise, credit card usage
becomes increasingly attractive to the extent that it obviates the need to spend time on tracking
and reconciling checking account expenditures. Mandell's data on the advantages of credit cards
are to the contrary. While the "convenience" measure rises by 60% as income goes from the
$7,500-10,000 range to the over $25,000, a measure of "helps keep track of spending" rises by
180%. L. MANDELL, supra note 44, at 46, Table 3-5. This can of course be explained by a
number of alternative, common sense hypotheses not themselves necessarily inconsistent with the
basic model. The point, nonetheless, remains-the matrix of motivations that inform consumer
preferences is considerally more complex than what the model suggests.
5 BC&S at 54; see id. at 70 n.7. There is some potential ambiguity in this regard, however.
The authors suggest that married people often have multiple checking accounts, and that
"maintaining optimal multiple balances requires an increase in total balances, unless some
low-cost overdraft feature like a credit card is available;" therefore, "other things being equal,
cards are used in place of checks to a greater degree by customers who . . . are married ....
Id. at 53. The statement under review, however, is that "single persons appear to use cards to a
greater degree than families with the same income. ... Id. at 54.
If by the latter they mean use averaged over the members of a family, the statements are
consistent, though not identical: the first suggests a ratio of credit cards to checks while the
second goes to a measure of card use in absolute terms. If, on the other hand, by the second
statement they mean use by individuals who are members of families, that is, by people who are
married, the two are inconsistent (again with the ratio vs. absolute measure qualification). These
ambiguities make defining and therefore testing the prediction difficult. I shall for this purpose
interpret the text in a way that avoids the inconsistency-that while married individuals may use
credit cards in place of checks more than single individuals do, the absolute use of credit cards
should be higher for a single person than for a family taken as a unit.
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This prediction is more closely linked to the basic model than are
any of the others.5 5 It is also the one most clearly falsified by the
available data. Again from Mandell's study of credit card use, the
data comparing usage ratios among family units are these: 56
Use of Credit Cards-Within Specific Groups
(percentage distribution of families)
Life Cycle Stage of Family Don't Use
Heads Under the Age of 45 Use Credit Cards Credit Cards
Unmarried, no children 39 61
Married, no children 64 36
Married, youngest child
under age 6 60 40
Married, youngest child
age 6 or older 65 35
Unmarried (any age),
has children 27 73
This tabulation, assuming its headings are accurate and that
"married" means not a married person but rather a family whose
head is married, seems clearly to show that single people, with or
without children, use credit cards of all types less than do families, not
more. The data do not hold income constant, but even assuming that
a family unit has two times the income of a single person the conclu-
sion is the same: across most of the income range doubling income
does not come close to doubling the frequency of credit card use. 57
It is difficult from these data alone to understand why the usage
rate varies as it does. 58  One not unlikely suspicion is that, contrary to
another of Baxter, Cootner and Scott's presumptions,59 married
couples do not always have multiple checking accounts but often have
only one. If that were true, then using a credit card would be a way to
" BC&S at 25 ("The phenomenon of opportunity cost of time is the problem ... that
appears most important for our model.").
L. MANDELL, supra note 44, at 14, Table 2-1.
I7 d. at 14. At, for example, family income levels of $10,000-$15,000, frequency of use is
67%; when income doubles to the $20,000-$30,000 range, frequency rises only to 81-84%.
Similarly, 54% at $7500-$10,000 becomes at the most 74% at $15,000-$20,000.
58 It is, however, striking how the correlation holds up even with age and location in life
cycle held constant. Thus families whose "head" is over 45, in the labor force and childless, used
cards more (58 % to 46 %) than did single people. Likewise for those over 45 and childless but not
in the labor force-families again used cards more often, by 35% to 23%. See L. MANDELL,
supra note 44, at 14, Table 2-1.
" See note 54 supra.
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engage in simultaneous expenditures without the need to have simul-
taneous access to the single checkbook register, and without the risk
that one family member's use of the account would accidentally result
in overdrafts when combined with the other's simultaneous use.
Whether that explanation is true or false, however, is not impor-
tant. What does matter is the simple fact that the prediction derived
from the model is quite strongly disconfirmed.
4. The Baxter, Cootner and Scott model, of behavior driven by
time costs and time costs a function of income, leads, in the context of
other considerations, to the statement that "nonrevolvers [those who
pay their balances in full each billing period] will use credit cards in
lieu of checks in almost every situation in which either is acceptable
.. . . Revolvers [those who incur credit costs on their credit card
accounts] will be more selective, using the card either occasionally for
larger purchases or with high intensity when income is less than
expected. "0 Elsewhere they offer the common sense observation that
"[a]mong customers with credit cards, it is the highest income cus-
tomers who are most likely to pay off their balances during the free
period [i.e., be nonrevolvers]".61
Combining the two leads easily to the proposition that higher
income individuals will use credit cards at every reasonable opportu-
nity; those in lower income classes will use their cards relatively less
frequently, and then primarily for those higher cost purchases for
which some credit extension may be necessary. The resulting inference
is a testable prediction, generated by and entirely consistent with the
basic structure of the theory.
As it happens, it doesn't quite work. The following table, again
from Mandell,6 2 is rearranged so that the likely size of the items
purchased declines from left to right:
Percentage of Households Using Cards for Various Expenditures
House-
Appli- Hard- hold Restau- Recre-
Income ances ware goods rants ation
Store (<$10,000 14 5 15 6 7
Cards $10-15,000 17 7 15 2 10
>$15,000 18 4 17 4 8
60 BC&S at 53-54.
61 Id. at 40.
62 L. MANDELL, supra note 44, at 70-71.
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Bank ( <$10,000 10 2 5 8 10
Cards $10-15,000 6 5 6 10 7
> $15,000 13 7 6 16 0
No pattern that would confirm the prediction seems to appear.
The usage rates are remarkably consistent across the income ranges, 3
with two exceptions: one ("Restaurants") is probably entirely ex-
plained by the fact that wealthier people dine out more often than do
poorer. The other ("Recreation") shows a strong correlation, but of
the wrong sign.6 4
A second, independent measure is to the same effect, though here
the data are less direct.6 5 Consider:
Amount Charged on Bank Cards During One Month Period 6
(Percentage distribution of families who use cards)
Family No $15 $30 $50 $75 $100$150 $200
Income charges $1-14 -29 -49 -74 -99 -149 -199 or more
Less than $3,000 62 13 13 * * * * * *
$3,000-4,999 56 11 11 11 * * * * 11
$5,000-7,499 50 3 5 14 11 9 2 2 2
$7,500-9,999 53 8 10 7 2 4 4 7 3
$10,000-14,999 59 5 12 5 8 1 3 1 3
$15,000-19,999 57 5 7 4 7 6 5 3 2
$20,000-24,999 51 3 8 11 5 3 11 3 3
$25,000 and over 43 3 11 3 * 5 19 * 11
'3 Suggesting that "revolvers will use credit cards for larger purchases" is misleading even if it
were correct, which it is not. There is some bias, for large purchases, in favor of retail
installment credit other than credit cards (67.5% in 1977, according to the 1977 CONSUMEa
CREDIT SURvEY, supra note 49, at 72-73). One possible explanation is that credit limits preclude
cards from being used by some people for some purchases. Baxter, Cootner & Scott's proposition
is difficult to test more rigorously because it ignores the inevitable variations in the amount of
credit available across various income groups.
"4 The variance for "Appliances" does not explain this prediction, though it is consistent with
another, viz. that higher-income customers will tend to avoid the high time cost of arranging for
purchase-specific installment credit. See BC&S at 41.
's It should perhaps have been noted earlier that all of these comparisons of theory with fact
are subject to an important, though not debilitating, criticism: it is generally not first-class social
science to employ for one purpose data that had been collected for another, and that is just what
I am doing here. In response it should be pointed out, in abatement though not in bar, that
Mandell collected his data not to establish any particular hypotheses, but, so to speak, neutrally.
66 L. MANDELL, supra note 44, at 59; see id. at 58 (same table for gasoline cards), 57 (all
credit cards).
HeinOnline  -- 2 Cardozo L. Rev.  418 1980 - 1981
1981] ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER
Wealthier families seem to spend more money. But the table goes
beyond that if we make the reasonable assumption that purchases in
the lower-price range-up to $50, for example-are unlikely to be
credit purchases. (Note that the table refers to total monthly pur-
chases, not typical purchase size.) Poorer people seem to use their
credit cards more often for small purchases than do their more afflu-
ent counterparts. Again a correlation, albeit somewhat inferential,
and again of the wrong sign. Among card-carrying households, 67 at
the least, this prediction seems to be false. 8
5. The final proposition, again ultimately derived from the basic
time-cost/payment-behavior structure of the theory, is that "[credit]
[c]ards have undoubtedly replaced checks" as a mode of payment, in
the sense that the market share of credit cards, in a rough equilib-
rium, comes at the expense of the more inconvenient, more time
consuming check.69
Mandell's investigations suggest that this prediction too seems to
be false, or at least to have been so at the time of his study. One of his
clearest conclusions, for example, was that "credit card use has little
effect on the size of the checking account balances held." 70  A slight
effect that did appear was in a direction opposite to what the report's
model would predict: holding income, location in life cycle, family
size and all other included variables constant, a multivariate analysis
demonstrated that credit card users wrote, on the average, four more
checks per month than did nonusers, an effect that could not be
attributed to any variable or combination of variables other than
credit card use. 7' The four additional checks might be to pay credit
card bills. But whatever the explanation, the empirical data falsify the
prediction: "[T]here is no evidence at this time that the use of credit
cards reduces the demand for checking deposits. 72
" The percentages are, again, based on card-using households, not all households. The latter
might be a better test of the prediction but for the fact that the availability of credit cards-as
opposed to their use-probably varies with income as well, so that had all households been in the
base it would have been difficult in the extreme to separate the two effects. See discussion at page
412 and the confession in note 65 supra.
" The defect of note 65 supra is particularly important here: Baxter, Cootner & Scott's
statement was made in terms of credit cards versus checks while Mandell's data go to the use of
credit cards in absolute terms. This falsification is to that extent less compelling than the others.
'0 BC&S at 54. Their comparison of checks vis-a-vis credit cards appears at id. at 51-52.
70 L. MANDELL, supra note 44, at 8 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 99, 102.
7I Id. at 103. It is also interesting to note that currency in circulation per capita grew
between 1960 and 1972 at a compound rate of 4%. During that period the number of $100 bills
in use grew 122%; $50s grew by 87.3%; and $20s by 89.6%. NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at
47-48. This took place despite the fact that 1960-1972 also marked an enormous growth in the use
of credit cards.
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The point of this quintet of comparisons between fact and theory
was, it should be stressed, not to refute the authors' views of the
opportunity costs of single people versus families, or credit card use
across income ranges, or even the relative conveniences of checks and
credit cards. Each of the preceding statements was a prediction gener-
ated by and consistent with the underlying consumer preference
model, a purportedly general set of presumptions about human eco-
nomic behavior. To the extent that the predictions as a group were
not clearly confirmed, the model with which they are consistent, and
from which they came, should itself be seen as losing ground. Once
the losses become significant, its utility as an heuristic device can
change in a subtle and not always apparent way-from being help-
fully descriptive to being, at least potentially, normative. Policy rec-
ommendations, therefore, that are grounded in the model, whether or
not directly related to these five derivative test points, must equally
lose their scientific force.
Consider now one final assertion of the Baxter, Cootner and Scott
report-this one being both a testable prediction and a matter cen-
trally important on its own: EFTS is good for consumers. Consumers
will therefore embrace EFTS as rapidly as producers' competition
brings it into being. 73  That seems not to be the case. The evidence is
"overwhelming" that consumers are "actively hostile" to the institu-
tion of EFTS,'4 with the possible exception of ATM's. 75  The theory
seems once again to be embarrassed by the facts.
[Moreover,] [i]n the last half of the 1960s the American Bankers Association and the
Federal Reserve System advocated a shift from the conventional paper-based pay-
ment system to one based on electronics and telecommunications. Yet, as we enter
the 1980s, we are still writing checks at a record pace.
Waldron & Ball, The Bottom Line on Checkless Banking, TECH. REV., Feb. 1980, at 43.
11 BC&S at 65. First, the argument is a non sequitur. It is quite possible that EFTS, although
objectively good for consumers, will not be perceived in that way by the consumers themselves.
This point, however, anticipates a bit. See discussion at pages 468-74 infra.
74 Schuck, Electronic Funds Transfer: A Technology in Search of a Market, 13 FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON CONFERENCE SERIES 153 (1974).
11 To which reactions have been mixed. Arthur D. Little, Inc.'s study for NSF/RANN, supra
note 5, concluded, in 1975, that regarding ATM's, "Consumer acceptance to date has been
excellent." Id. at 9. Duffy & Duffy, however, concluded that so far (1974) there is only mild
consumer interest in "automated banking services." H. DUFFY & R. DUFFY, ELECTRONIC MONEY
IN PERSPECTIVE 19 (1974). And, at the other end of the continuum, it was reported that, at
Citibank's Queens ATM, "most of the customers preferred to wait in line a few moments and
deal with the teller rather than test the new machines." N.Y. Times, May 31, 1977, at 41.
This is a very interesting observation when stated in an alternative way: suppose "a few
moments" equals five minutes; and suppose, as Baxter, Cootner & Scott do, that each minute
costs each consumer something like 10o. See BC&S at 25. Using a Baxteresque analysis, we could
say that consumers were willing to pay at least 50c to avoid using an ATM-or, alternatively, to
[Vol. 2:397
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A number of pilot projects7 and marketing studies77 have ad-
dressed each of the components of EFTS. They conclude, consistently,
that individuals are well satisfied with the existing currency and check
system 78 and will resist the inroads of EFTS. 7  "[T]he banking public
is not ready to trade the present check-oriented payments system-no
matter how cumbersome-for a checkless system-no matter how
streamlined."80 This is true both of the ACH (DDP-PAD) system and
see a real teller. That conclusion is, of course, inconsistent with the larger idea, that consumers
will prefer the time-saving convenience of ATM's. Or it just says that time isn't always seen as a
real cost, in which case only the foundation of the Baxter, Cootner & Scott analysis is weakened.
76 For example, with respect to direct deposit of payroll (ACH-DDP), the United States
Government's (as employer) experience has been that among the most sophisticated of its
employees, only 55-60% have agreed to DDP; and among blue collar workers "only a few
percent" will accept DDP. NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 84.
77 Despite the fact that Baxter, Cootner & Scott dismiss the ACH component as irrelevant to
bank-customer relations-a fact I have already criticized, see discussion at pages 417-19-it is
important to explore the related marketing data about ACH/DDP/PAD here: it is generally
agreed that DDP-PAD is a central component of any future with EFTS in it. Id.
78 BRAND, GRUBER, STANDER & Co., ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM, A DErH
STUDY FOR THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION (1970): "As of today the market is extremely
happy with the present system," id. at 27, even to the point that "customers are reluctant to
substitute credit cards for checks in the bill paying process." Opinion Research Corp., Virginia
Consumer Attitudes Toward Payments Systems 8 (1974) (study for the Virginia Bankers Associa-
tion).
71 Bus. WEEK, Apr. 18, 1977, at 80 ("[Tlhe public has not accepted the idea."). See generally
BRAND, GRUBER, STANDER & Co., supra note 78.
10 Virginia's Survey, THE SOUTHERN BANKER, Aug. 1974, at 38. See also A.D. LITTLE, INC.,
THE BANKERS' EFT HANDBOOK 14, 17 (1975) and studies reviewed by Schuck, Electronic Funds
Transfer: A Technology in Search of a Market, 35 Md. L. Rev. 76-78 (1975). This curious
conclusion has been supported many times over. Perhaps the starkest statement appears in
Elliott, Marketing Today in American Banking 18 (1974) (student thesis, University of Southern
California Graduate School of Business Administration) (copy on file with the author) which
reports the results of an "informal" survey of public opinion about the attributes people would
like to see in their banks. Note, in the following, the wide disparity between number 1 and
numbers 10 and 11.
Percent
1. Convenient location 94
2. Extended operating hours 92
3. Friendly personnel 78
4. Free checking accounts 76
5. Funds transfer by phone (savings
to checking. . .) 57
6. Automatic overdraft 49
7. Higher interest (1/2 % paid on savings) 43
8. Drive-up teller window 37
9. Convenient parking 35
10. Automated 24-hours teller terminals 21
11. Automatic bill-paying 17
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of the POS system with which the report was concerned, 8' and for a
single reason-not only are there very serious intangible costs to con-
sumers in EFT systems, there are precious few benefits.
As to ACH-related services (DDP and PAD), the most favorable
study yet reported found that only 40 % of its respondents approved of
DDP: 51 % approved of PAD 82 but only 17 % did so when PAD was
combined with a negative balance feature.8 3  Very few respondents
(8%) surveyed in these empirical studies found it inconvenient to
deposit income checks.8 4  An equally small number (10%), when
asked directly, responded that the cost of writing checks was too
high. 5 Of those who did put a money cost on check writing, most
tended to include postage, envelopes, and checking account fees, but
not the cost of their time. 86  Time spent writing checks-more
broadly, effecting payments-seems not to be regarded by most peo-
ple as a cost, or at least not as an important one. Perhaps there is no
more satisfying way in which that time can be invested? 87
POS studies generally reached similar, if not even more devastat-
ing, conclusions. The American Bankers Association survey of banking
households found only a 10 % approval rate for POS. 88 "Shorter trans-
action time makes little impact on the shopping trip as a whole ...
transaction time is not usually a major consideration.""
11 IV APP/GIT PHASE III, supra note 6, at 163-79. The "cash card" (POS) device "does not
appear to have great potential. There does not seem to be strong interest in having this service,
much less in having to pay for the privilege." Id. at 172-73.
11 Id. at 4. The BRAND, GRUBER, STANDER & Co. study came to a similar conclusion-i.e.,
that a maximum of 50% would accept PAD for fixed recurring payments, and a maximum of
only 10% would accept PAD for variable bills. supra note 78, at 35-36.
"' BRAND, GRUBER, STANDER & CO., supra note 78, at 4. The APP found one other interesting
datum. In response to the question, "Is it convenient to cash or deposit the paycheck?", 88 % said
yes and 8% said no. Id. at 44. Of the 8% who said no, only 6% of them approved of DDP. Id. at
49.
84 See note 83 supra; IV APP/GIT PHASE III, supra note 6, at 4, 6, 44.
15 Opinion Research Corp., supra note 78, at 6.
8' The median per month cost was reported as $1.67; the median number of checks was 11,
or approximately 15c each. Id. at 63-64. The median amount of time was about one hour per
month spent in check-writing. Id. at 61. Thus, the total cost of $1.67, after deduction of "real"
costs such as postage, leaves very little if anything as a cited cost of time. The study concludes
that "the perceived cost of paying bills appears to be relatively independent of the amount of
time taken to pay bills." IV APP/GIT PHASE III, supra note 6, at 64. In other words, people
don't value their time in the way that Baxter, Cootner & Scott feel they should. This is consistent
with another finding, that those who would pay for a monthly bill-paying service would be
willing to pay only about $1.67 per month. NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 256.
87 Indeed, as personal incomes rise, and working hours fall, it may very well come to pass
that many people will value positively having something to do for an hour each month, other
than go bowling. The time might be useful for reviewing budgets; making plans; thinking, in
general, about managing one's financial affairs.
88 Opinion Research Corp., supra note 78, at 8.
88 IV APP/CIT PHASE III, supra note 6, at 169.
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EFTS, say Baxter, Cootner and Scott, is "unequivocally advanta-
geous to consumers." Why haven't consumers noticed?90 (And what
does the failure of that assertion say about the construction of the
analytical methodology?) A hint here and there can be gleaned from
the empirical work of some researchers who, not content with theory-
driven psychological postulates, have asked consumers themselves
why they believe and behave as they do. The responses are enriching,
even as to systemically trivial matters.
With respect to DDP, for example, objections have ranged from
the sophisticated (concerns about establishing proof of payment for
IRS claims)9' to the brutish (some wage-earners wish to be paid in
cash or check so that their wives' [sic] allowances can be controlled),"
and include doubts by some that they will be able to do the minimal
bookkeeping that a non-cash system requires.93
PAD had its fillips too. A surprisingly large proportion of all
households juggle their budgets by controlling the timing of their
bill-paying. PAD systems will probably interfere with that process.
PAD, DDP and POS combined will eliminate both the juggling gaps
and the ability of consumers to float deposits and payments. Baxter,
Cootner and Scott identify the potential objection of consumers to
PAD as an objection to losing the economic value of what is now
interest-free borrowing, viz. float.9 4  That is simply not the whole
matter. Juggling occurs not because consumers are maximizing the
value of their assets, but because they are experiencing the real-world
11 BC&S at 65. It is interesting to put some of the consumer objections to EFTS in perspec-
tive. The APP study presented a sample population with a number of statements relating to
payments and the payments process, and tested the general level of agreement expressed for each
statement. First among the twenty-seven, in order of level of agreement, was [w]e must have
records of payment for future reference." Second was "[w]e keep up to data [sic]records [to]
know our current balance." Third was, "We want to be personally involved in every financial
transaction that affects us." And thirteenth (with an agreement score well below the mean) was,
"I often need cash quickly for certain transactions." IV APP/CIT PHASE III, supra note 6, at
110-11.
91 Opinion Research Corp., supra note 78, at 4.
92 BRAND, GRUBER, STANDER & Co., supra note 78, at 50; NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 254.
93 NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 254. This point deserves a further note of explanation. Many
people, it happens, have learned to survive with "eyeball budgeting," i.e., "I look in my wallet
to see if I can afford [X]. ... " With respect especially to PAD, it was noted in the Virginia
study that "serious and consistent budgeting is not widespread; thus a rigid prepayment plan
may cause serious money handling difficulties for families who handle their present bill paying
with a great deal of flexibility." Opinion Research Corp., supra note 78, at 3.
11 BC&S at 55. Checks, while traveling, are not debited to the drawer's account. A check can
therefore be mailed and covered by funds deposited later. Baxter, Cootner & Scott deal with this
loss of float, characteristically, by measuring such losses against gains in opportunity time costs.
1981]
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effects of income and wealth constraints. It looks like economic opti-
mizing only if one fails to look closely. 95 Most of these and similar
small problems are amenable to regulatory or technical fixes: PAD
debits could be made reversible;' 6 analogues to stop-order rights could
be created;9 7 fraud losses could be allocated however we like. None of
these problems is intrinsic to EFTS; all of them reflect but minor
additional dimensions to the hypothesized anthropology. It is, there-
fore, even more difficult to understand the full severity and extent of
consumer resistance to EFTS. Some more fundamental, more surpris-
ing revisions are necessary if the model of homo economicus is to
work-if we are to avoid the risk of calling a thing good when it
conforms to what we begin by assuming.
IV. WHERE THE MODEL FAILS: A
RICHER NOTION ABOUT PEOPLE
It is difficult to overstress the significance of the central difficulty
with the Baxter, Cootner and Scott model; EFT systems, it says, are
good for people. But people don't want EFT systems. People seem
stubbornly not to embrace what is "unequivocally" in their-and
therefore society's-best interests "in terms of time and money. "98 It
has already been suggested that the model's equation of time/activity
with money/cost is seriously suspect. If that were the whole of the
problem, however, it would still not be possible to explain all of the
anti-EFTS reactions that numerous surveys and pilot studies have
disclosed. We would expect in that case to see at worst consumer
indifference, and therefore public acceptance of EFT systems pro-
ceeding as rapidly as banks, driven by reductions in their own costs,
can make the conversion. Things have gone rather more slowly than
that. It must be, therefore, that there is a larger problem.
Perhaps economic goods like time and money do not account
adequately for consumer behavior. If that is true, the implications for
this genre of legal policy analysis reach beyond the mere failure of one
empirical prediction. There is, again, a connection, embedded deeply
within the analytical regime, between its confidence in the consumer
o' See pages 467-68 infra.
See generally Schuck, supra note 80, at 82; BRAND, GRUBER, STANDER & Co., supra note
78, at 34; the EFTS Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (Supp. 111 1979); Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. §
205 (1980).
11 In fact, Congress has taken a half step in exactly that direction, by preserving the
stop-payment rights of consumers as to PAD (but not as to POS). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693e(a),
1693a(9), 1693h(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979) (sections of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, now part
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act). See note 29 supra.
01 BC&S at 65.
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psychology it adopts and its confidence in the ability of unregulated
markets to serve collective consumer interests. If the former fails,
there is reason to wonder about the latter.""
The former fails. Why? Although it may never be possible to
describe a single unified field of human behavior, there are some
forces that may be suggested by the richer views of people developed
within other disciplines. This section essays a few such suggestions
drawn from literature, psychology, the humanities, and from
sociological analyses of EFTS itself. Again employing EFTS as the
context of the critique, the discussion will be organized around the
three major attributes of all EFT systems: They deal with money;
they employ in obvious ways electronic computing and data process-
ing machinery; and they will pervade a fair segment of all social
activity with an intrusive potential far greater than that of payment
systems of the past or present.
A. The Affect of Money
Money is only a store of resource entitlements and checks are but
a transitory reification of money. A number of empirical inquiries,
however, suggest that there is more to money than money, and that
the payments process might be a source of positive utility 00 rather
than only a device to be suffered grudgingly.
DDP involves a direct conduit from a payor, such as an em-
ployer, to the recipient's depository bank. Unlike the payee of a
paycheck who is able to fondle the item briefly on its way to the bank
or the bar, the employee of a DDP payor receives at most a notice
advising him that two institutions have handed his earnings from one
to the other. It is of course entirely logical to suggest that the differ-
ence is irrelevant, that in either case (absent a combined DDP-PAD
system) the same amount is subject to the recipient's eventual control.
But that suggestion is not faithful to psychological (as opposed to
square-cornered functional) reality. Checks and money provide tangi-
ble even if symbolic rewards for the week's labor, a satisfaction that
DDP, even with receipts for the deposit, may not. 0 1
This implication is explained in section VI infra.
100 "Utility" is used here in its broadest economic sense-it means something like "perceived
welfare," or satisfaction or even happiness.
101 See the Bank Marketing Association study cited in NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 254. It is
interesting to note that this "reward" phenomenon is a direct report of queried respondents, not
an interpretation by behavioral scientist observers. See id.
1981]
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This and other'02 similar symbolic functions are not intrinsic to
check systems nor of necessity absent from EFTS. They can be un-
learned: humans evolved from a primordial ooze that did not, so far
as is known, originally include negotiable instruments, and cash prob-
ably wasn't used for the first million years of homo sapiens' era. But
that is not the point. Some people value check-handling because it is a
source of positive satisfaction; the existence of this noneconomic utility
is the point-a small enrichment of the model.
Some of the affect of checks and money is more tenacious. Con-
sider PAD. Individuals will generally accept deductions, pre-autho-
rized debits effected by an employer, from their gross pay. The same
people will not readily accept PAD-debits to demand deposit ac-
counts that come after net pay. 10 3 That is not really suprising. Net
pay may be the important reality, the area of discretion left to oneself
by oneself and others.
As one survey respondent put it, "If they put my paycheck in my
account automatically and then take the money for my bills out
automatically ... , what do they need me for?"'' 0 4  The survey's
conclusion was clear: "[C]hecks are of positive psychological benefit.
They give the individual a feeling of control over his life. . "105 To
handle cash and to effect bill paying by incurring the costs and
inconvenience of deposit making and check writing and reconciling
accounts is a tangible act of autonomy: individuals do often feel that
their ability to write checks reflects their power to shape important
aspects of their environment, 106 to make autonomous choices. 0 7 This
is hardly homo economicus; it is nevertheless real. The point, again, is
not that EFTS will fail, but rather how the model employed to
analyze EFTS may have failed.
B. Computers and Bureaucracies
A more important and more illuminating dimension of the aver-
sion to EFT systems reinforces the richer view of things. Elaborate
computer-based systems designed to help consumers manage their
01 Including the finding that, for some, the handling of money is a "sensual experience,"
Opinion Research Corp., supra note 78, at 9, and that the use and retention of checks satisfy
"'emotional" urges, or the pack-rat drive, to have checks stand as surrogates for expenditures
gone by. Indeed, 45 % of all check writing households retain their cancelled checks for at least six
years. Id. at 38-39.
'03 See THE BANKERS' EFT HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 13.
104 BRAND, CRUBER, STANDER & Co., supra note 78, at 15.
101 Id. at 15.
106 Id. at 34.
" Opinion Research Corp., supra note 78, at 14. The topic of autonomy is explored in
further detail at pages 430-41 infra.
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financial affairs are widely regarded as a menace. 108 "No EFT system
yet devised appears to be able to convince consumers that they will
retain control . ... ,109 Whence this aversion, and what does it say?
It is, in part, a fear of bureaucratic intransigence and inexorable
rationality, a revulsion from the prospect of becoming a part of a
large, dehumanized system,"l0 a system perceived as complex, imper-
sonal and ubiquitous, controlled not by accessible individuals but by a
technology operating efficiently."' There is a combination of atti-
tudes here, among them a belief that the more complex and embrac-
ing a system is the harder it is to correct its errors, 1 2 a high level of
distrust of banks and other large institutions generally," 3 and an
association of computers and the large institutions which use them
with inflexibility, difficulty of communication and a "lack of com-
passion.""l1 4  The aversions are not unfounded." 5  They are in fact
18 Cox, Developing an Electronic Funds Transfer System: Incentives and Obstacles, 13
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON CONFERENCE SERIES 15, 29 (1974). Note, in a related vein, the
remarks of K. O'Beilley (Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) in a 1976
speech entitled "EFTS: Consumer Concerns," at 8-9:
We share the concern of welfare rights advocates who point out that public
assistance recipients may someday face a system of compulsory deposit of welfare or
other public assistance checks coupled with requirements for specified preauthorized
payments for food, shelter and utilities. This could lead to a totally unfair situation
in which welfare recipients will have dictated to them the government approved
priorities as to the way they spend their money ...
Not just low income consumers, but all consumers, must be assured that EFT
will not result in a policy of undue pressures on them to enter numerous preauthor-
ized payment agreements. The principle of preauthorized payment is sound in terms
of efficiency and we do not question its advantages including increased convenience.
Consumers can and do benefit from preauthorization. However, as it approaches the
point where an individual's money pool has been almost totally committed to
preauthorization payments there is a disturbing potential result. Namely, it has the
practical effect of putting individuals in situations where they sacrifice control and
management of their own finances and relinquish the right to determine on a regular
basis their own spending priorities.
'0 NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 84.
'10 Cf. Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (sincerely held religious belief
that obtaining social security numbers would jeopardize spiritual well-being prevailed over the
requirement that such numbers be furnished as an aid to prevent welfare fraud). In one recent
survey, 73% of the respondents agreed with the statement that, "[T]he problem with govern-
ment and big business is that they have reduced individuals to a set of punched holes in an IBM
card." A. WESTIN & N. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY. 480, (1972).
"I One excellent analysis of the public's attitude towards computers is Lee, Social Attitudes
and the Computer Revolution, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 53 (1970).
" Opinion Research Corp., supra note 78, at 8.
113 Id. at 20.
14 See NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 44; BRAND, CRUBER, STANDER & Co., supra note 78, at 16.
"s Though for present purposes it is sufficient to note only that these motivations and
attitudes exist, and not why, it can enhance the analysis to digress briefly into the nature of
computing networks.
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quite accurate, as the background of such things as the Fair Credit
Billing Act118 can attest. Nor, to presage a later discussion,"' are they
aversions for which an unregulated market is able to correct.
Mechanized billing systems do make errors. A recent study of
credit card billings presented these findings: " 8
Percentage of Respondents Reporting at Least One Error
Income Retail Store Cards Bank Credit Cards






> 25,000 24 7
All 15% 4%
Another datum from this study is the more compelling. Of all
respondents surveyed, "3 per cent complained of difficulty in getting
errors corrected""' All of those three percent were necessarily within
the group of respondents who reported having had billing errors
I The Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), is now part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See note 29
supra. It mandates a dispute resolution procedure for creditors, but more directly, it mandates
responsiveness by the creditor to the debtor's plaint. As to the background, see generally
Inaccurate and Unfair Billing Practices: Hearings on S. 1630 and S. 914 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973).
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976 & Supp. III 1979), is
responsive to the same pattern of bureaucratic inertia and secretiveness as is the FCBA:
In neither case has the law directly mandated different outcomes in the respective
private actions. It has, rather, erected a system of revelatory and participatory
rights-a sort of private due process, if you will, predicated as much on the value of
sharing in the process as on the supposed reduction of error that an expanded process
may afford. The creditor must take notice of the consumer on an individual basis.
When the consumer speaks, the creditor may refuse to listen only at its peril.
Dauer, Federal Regulation of Consumer Credit Transactions: A Trend Toward Individuation,
52 CONN. B.J. 130, 155 (1978). The background of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (horror stories
and all) is in Fair Credit Reporting: Hearings on H.R. 16340 and S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
"7 See pages 465-68 infra.
"I R. SHAY & W. DUNKELBERG, RETAIL STORE CREDIT CARD USE IN NEW YORK 40 (1975). The
question asked was: "Have any of the credit card bills sent to you in the past year by the
following types of credit card issuers contained mistakes?" Id. at 35.
"I Id. at 43.
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made.120  That 3% is 20% of 15% and 75% of 4%. Although errors
are infrequently made-assuming that one out of seven, or one out of
twenty-five, is infrequently-once made they are perceived as being
very difficult to correct.
As to intransigence, perhaps the most perceptive insights about
computers, and their institutional use, are those of M.I.T.'s Weizen-
baum, who identifies as the qualitative difference between computers
and most other tools the fact that computers are themselves partially
autonomous-they run "on the basis of internalized models of some
aspect of the real world.' 2' Despite the fact that it is people who
initially program the model, computer autonomy is nevertheless a
useful clue to what is often troubling-a perception that relevance
becomes unalterably and insensitively narrowed.
Several things can and do happen when a credit scoring system
for example is put onto a computer program. For one, there is a
reluctance of those charged with decisionmaking to accept an argu-
ment that the computer's "judgments" are in error. Computers, it is
thought, operate on hard facts by objective algorithms. Unlike hu-
mans, who are prone to cognitive and computational errors caused by
subjective assessments of the facts and issues before them, computers
do not make subjective mistakes. This attitude has a cognate manifes-
tation: the model on which the computer is operating is right. An item
about an individual which cannot be coded into the scoring systems'
quantifying scales is not a relevant item,122 and it is right that it should
not be; after all, this is a computer program, designed to take advan-
tage of experience and analysis beyond the capacity of any mere
person. As one commentator offered,
120 Assume a population of 100 people with bank credit cards. Three (A, B and C) report
difficulty in getting errors corrected. Four report billing errors. Of the four, A, B and C must be
three of them. Therefore, 3 out of 4 who experienced a billing error had difficulty having it
corrected. This and related problems have not escaped the attention of some students of EFTS.
The National Science Foundation's study concluded, for example, that -[T]he new role for the
consumer in EFTS will lead to many instances of confusion, frustration, and total anger if the
system functions in correct but mysterious ways (to the consumer), or if it malfunctions ...
[F]or many financial institutions this will represent a new challenge and require much more
attention to customer relations than has been demonstrated to date. " NSF/RANN, supra note 5,
at 110 (emphasis added).
121 Weizenbaum, On the Impact of the Computer on Society, 176 Sci. 609, 610 (1972).
122 Again to anticipate a later discussion, this effect of narrowed relevance has its existential
costs. It matters to people that organizational decisionmakers will not only come to know more
about a subject than they would freely reveal, but will in addition tend to define the subject, for
their purposes, as adequately represented by the data.
Even if the assumptions and the data are correct, it still traverses the fact that humans tend
to want to be not just predictable response mechanisms, but fully autonomous, always individ-
ual, and constantly becoming. See discussion at pages 438-42 infra.
19811
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The fact that many organizations actually base their decisions on-
worse, take their decisions from-computer models is profoundly
disturbing given the current state of the computer art. Similar
feelings about the written word persist to this day: If something is
"in black and white" it must somehow be true. 2 3
Self-validation may not be inherent in physical computer tech-
nology. Chips of silicon wafers, of course, are incapable of being evil
on their own. Thus far, however, such self-validation, while fre-
quently false, remains a likely, if not inevitable, artifact of the rela-
tionship between the machines and those who run them. As Kenneth
Karst wrote,
the facts that emerge from the computer will become the only
significant facts about the subject of the inquiry . . . because of the
very great differences, in convenience and cost, between accepting
what the computer tells us and going behind its report. . . . And
when the subject himself tries to explain, he will be met with more
resistance primarily because he has to rely on outside sources,
which are apt to be thought of as softer, lacking the computer's
deceptive precision. 4
This begins to explain the marketing resistance that EFTS have
encountered.12 5  To connect it simultaneously to EFTS on the one
113 Kay, Microelectronics and the Personal Computer, 237 SCIENTIFIC AM. 231 (1977).
124 Karst, The Files: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal
Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 361-62 (1966). And, as Weizenbaum observed,
Not only have policy makers abdicated their decision-making responsibility to a
technology they don't understand, all the while maintaining an illusion that they,
the policy makers, are formulating policy questions and answering them, but re-
sponsibility has altogether evaporated. No human is any longer responsible for what
the machine says. Thus there can be neither right nor wrong, no question of justice,
no theory with which one can agree or disagree, and finally no basis on which one
can challenge "what the machine says."
See Weizenbaum, supra note 121, at 611-13.
"I There are other, more subtle, aspects of visible computerization to which consumers may
be responding. Many technological revolutions have had impacts far greater, in what may have
at first seemed to be remote directions, than in their more immediate functional consequences.
One thinks immediately of television, a prime example of something which did an old thing
(communicating) better, but which came to have unbelievably pervasive cultural consequences.
Another example is the microscope, a mere optical glass, but one that led to the discovery that
disease was microbial and not divine punishment for the afflicted's sin.
Similarly, and again as Weizenbaum observed, one of the most subtle and pernicious
aspects of any "technologizing" move is that the nature of the issues changes to embrace only
those amenable to further technological adjustments. That is to say, that because whoever
controls the questions can affect the nature of the answers, we begin to find ourselves regarding
"will it work, and how can it be made safe?" to be the only questions, rather than only subsidiary
issues to the more basic question "Do we really need this?" Or even want it. See Weizenbaum,
supra note 121, at 611-12.
These effects too may be motivations for "irrational" consumer choice.
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hand, and to heuristic anthropology on the other, one might put a
single question: Why does any of this matter, so long as the efficiency
of exchange relations is enhanced? Even if one imagines an ubiquitous
EFT network with silent computers efficiently allocating credit and
cheaply doing automatically what individuals would necessarily
choose to do anyway-a vision Baxter, Cootner and Scott seem to
reject-why ought consumers to object?128
Imagine anyone, perhaps an economist, breakfasting with the
Sunday Times, orange juice and a bagel, and contemplating the
balance of the day. Before him lie three options: Playing golf, watch-
ing a baseball game on TV, and working in the basement workshop.
Suppose further that the preference among them is in just that or-
der-golf, baseball and the workshop-so that if left undisturbed he
would head for the links directly after the crossword puzzle. Enter
spouse, who announces that because the poker club will be at the
house that afternoon, he will have to play golf.
In 1966 Professor Jack Brehm published the results of his research
into what he styled the Theory of Psychological Reactance. 127 The
theory, rooted in the empirical tradition of experimental psychology,
states generally that higher organisms including-if not especially-
humans are subject to motivational disquiet when "free behaviors"
are threatened. Brehm postulates that a subject will be aroused when-
ever an option previously open is actually or potentially foreclosed. As
a behaviorist, Brehm regards this arousal as a behavioral stimulus: the
subject acts so as to reconstruct the free behavior set that existed prior
to the confining event. The evidence, however, supports a larger
interpretation: the reactance that arises when some part of the per-
ceived free behavior set is extinguished is a matter of disquiet or
perturbation. Or, conversely, people value freedom frGm interference
with their preexisting set of opportunities.
' Baxter, Cootner & Scott cite, by way of a strawman rapidly to be dismissed, Orwell's
1984-a vision of the future in which Big Brother is always watching. BC&S at 162. Whether
they are correct in dismissing 1984 as hysterical emotionalism as to EFTS is an issue, but one that
misses the point. At the height of the novel, Orwell's central character came to define his
freedom as the ability to believe that two plus two equals four-a representation of the "truth"
which the state would require him to deny. Interestingly enough, the central character of
Dostoevsky's NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND also came to symbolize what was for him an important
dimension of freedom by pointing to the need to assert, and be dealt with as if the belief were
important, that sometimes two plus two equals five. It is not that I prefer the hallucinations of
existentialists to the nightmares of avant garde political scientists. It is a fact, however, that
Baxter, Cootner & Scott's dismissal of 1984 neglects the more insidious of the threats which
technological advance presents-not the risk of forced error, but the inability to escape the
rationalism of the ajudgmental bureaucrat.
127 See J. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966).
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The spouse's poker club announcement will, the theory predicts,
result in a reactance: the economist will form a new preference order-
ing, one in which the desirability of baseball and the workshop will
increase and of golf will decrease; or so the subject will report and
actually feel. He will accordingly be motivated both to recapture his
ability to watch television at home or use his workshop, and to avoid
the circumstance which constrained the pre-existing opportunity set.
The example is trivial; the effect is important. It has been veri-
fied with human subjects in a remarkably wide variety of circum-
stances. (One can only wish that Brehm had collaborated with those
other researchers who investigated consumer reactions to futuristic
PAD systems-processes which do automatically what one might oth-
erwise have to do anyway.) Brehm's data confirm some refinements of
the theory that take it beyond the prosy observation that people prefer
more freedom to less. Some of these refinements are particularly
interesting in the context of EFT and the observations just made about
computers and bureaucracies, and might be articulated for the pur-
pose of comparison as follows:
* Reactance occurs when a free behavior is perceived as being
jeopardized. It varies positively with the importance of the eliminated
opportunity, negatively with the importance of those not threatened,
and positively with the percentage of the total set which the eliminated
portion occupies.
* Reactance varies with the perceived magnitude of the threat,
which in turn is a function of credibility and, for a human or institu-
tional actor, of social power.
* The actual or threatened elimination of one behavior may
implicitly threaten other behaviors; the total reactance is thus a func-
tion of actual and implicit threats. The magnitude of the reactance
varies as the threat is perceived as directed versus random, personal
versus impersonal.
To recast the preceding discussion in terms of EFTS:
• An urbanized industrial society requires an intensive division of
labor and an extensive degree of exchange. Barter is generally impos-
sible; payments systems are pervasive even unto those things on which
one's very survival depends. Being a consumer is not only something
all have in common, it is something that occupies a fair portion of
one's total activity. The payments system therefore is comprehensive,
if not ubiquitous.
* Computers operate on the basis of internalized models of the
real world; computerized systems are perceived as being inexorable as
well as infallible: what they do in case A they will do in case B as long
as they are not programmed to respond to a difference between the
[Vol. 2:39.7
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two cases. A programmed misuse of data in one case will threaten a
similar misuse in numerous other cases.
e Banks have high social weight. Threatened reductions of free
behaviors when implied by banks will have a greater effect than do
those of many other institutions. Banks control important parts of the
payments mechanism; they control access to credit and creditworthi-
ness and behave in quiet and secretive ways.
* Information is an important ingredient in "control.' 128  So is
possession. Banks, as the managers of present and future payments
mechanisms, have access to large quantities of information. They also
have, most of the time, at least temporary possession of nearly every-
one's wealth.
The point, of course, is not to tie the marketing problems EFTS
has faced to any one particular psychological theory, though the link
here seems particularly strong. What is being suggested is severalfold:
first, the documented reactions to EFT systems are neither transitory
artifacts nor merely consumer inertia. They are real difficulties which
reflect an important theme in human behavior. Second, is the theme
itself. The behavioral model of Baxter, Cootner and Scott appears by
contrast to be rather thin. 12 It does not account for such "irrationali-
ties." Brehm's thesis is just one example of the kinds of enrichments
that are both possible and necessary if a psychological model is to
serve as a cornerstone for what becomes a methodology of policy
analysis.
A third point, to look forward a bit, 30 is to demonstrate that the
hypothesis about autonomy, "dignity" as it will presently be styled,
has at least one rigorous empirical analogue. Brehm's theory deals
with the appearance of choice. Autonomy resides in the sense of
having chosen.
Central to the credibility of the Baxter, Cootner and Scott report,
its methodology and its recommendations, is the confidence one has in
being able to identify what is a benefit and what is a cost.
128 The connection between Brehm and the discussion of privacy, at pages 434-42 infra, is
echoed here too-consider the reactance which determinism (more precisely, the work of
behaviorists such as Skinner) might itself cause; we react adversely even to those things that
traverse our illusions of freedom.
121 It too is based on a small number of psychological postulates, far cruder than Brehm's.
Brehm's work suggests just how difficult and complex the psychology of "economic" behavior
can be, a complexity that EFTS encounter but for which Baxter, Cootner & Scott seem not to
account. Some members of their school have attempted to deal with such phenomena in rigorous
even if not empirical ways. One extraordinary attempt, on a related issue, is Stigler & Becker,
De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977).
"3 See discussion at pages 438-42 infra.
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C. Privacy, Dignity and an Unhappy Russian Novelist
1. The Quantum of Change
This essay opened with the observation that EFTS portends a
revolution, a sharp acceleration in the history of banking. Baxter,
Cootner and Scott disagree. ' 3' Their view comprises four identifiable
assertions: (1) EFTS is a natural market response to potential reduc-
tions in the internal cost structure of retail banking brought about by
technological progress. (2) EFTS is essentially a communications de-
vice. Therefore, as a new way to do old things, it presents no new
issues. (3) Because the pressure for EFTS is entirely a function of its
cost advantages, its introduction will be gradual; it is no different nor
will it be more abrupt than have been other changes in the history of
payments processes. (4) It will be an additional method of payment
making; like other, earlier technological changes, EFTS will for the
foreseeable future coexist with rather than displace existing payment
systems.
The first point is true, though incomplete in ways that will be
apparent shortly. 32 The second point is false. Point three is probably
false as well. Point four is debatable-uncertain in ways that may
have significant implications for regulatory policy. 33 We shall begin
with the second point.
Glanville Williams once said that the difference between a differ-
ence in kind and a difference in degree is mainly a difference in
degree.134 As to the prospect that EFT systems, when and if fully in
place, may affect the possibilities for systemic invasions of consumers'
privacy, Baxter, Cootner and Scott hold that the degree of privacy
currently enjoyed is in part a consequence of the high cost of collect-
ing, storing and retrieving information; while the technology of EFTS
will reduce those costs, they will continue to counter the possibility of
privacy invasion. In fact, a shift from the present check-based process
131 "It is not our purpose to argue that today's problems are no different from those of the
past, but these analogies do suggest to us that any differences are of degree rather than kind and
that the magnitudes of those differences pose empirical questions without obvious answers."
BC&S at 5. Furthermore,
One of the greatest dangers inherent in discussions of electronic funds transfer is the
temptation to treat this new technology as an event in banking so unique that it will
cause a fundamental change in the banking business and require a unique treatment
of rules and regulations to bring it to fruition without wreaking damage.
Id. at 3.
"I2 See discussion at pages 457-64 infra.
133 See discussion at pages 460-64 infra.
'34 Williams, Language and the Law, 61 LAW Q. REv. 71, 192 (1945).
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to even a modest electronic mode will at the least effect a ninety-eight
percent reduction in those costs. 135  That difference in degree begins
to look like a difference in kind.
This fifty-to-one ratio for some parts of the process is only the
beginning of the future. Moreover, EFTS is potentially more than
communications. Electronic Data Processing (EDP) has undergone its
own revolution during the past decade. In the 1960's, when large-
scale computational capacity was first being put into place, EDP was
largely a matter of calculating, testing and sorting.1 36  The 1970's
marked a change from the age of computing to the age of information
systems. The technology of the 1970's, which includes an information
storage and analysis speed one hundred million times faster than that
of the precomputer era,137 has radically altered the amount of infor-
mation that, at reasonable notice, can be known. It therefore a for-
tiori has changed the relevance of information that may have been
retained but previously could not, without expensive advance prepa-
ration, be used. EFTS is an information management system.1 38
Such exponential strides in information processing capacity allow
for significant changes in what is processed and for what purpose.
EFTS can easily exploit these opportunities.139  Consider for example
a household or individual as the originator of payment/exchange
transactions, participating in discrete deals with Retailer A, Retailer
115 Present estimates of the cost of microfilming a check and storing the film (i.e., capturing
the data concerning amount, date, payee, and drawer) is presently about $0.0005 per item (not
including sorting and other processing), or in exponential form, 5 x 10-2 cents. If the same
information were captured and stored on magnetic tape or "floppy disc" storage, it could be
recorded and filed at a cost of about 105 cents per bit. Assuming that 100 bits would suffice, the
per item cost would be about 10-3 cents. This figure (10- 3 cents) is 2% of the present figure of 5 x
10-2. Thus far, only storage has been calculated. The retrieval and analysis ratios are even
greater orders of magnitude. See generally Holton, The Large-Scale Integration of Microelec-
tronic Circuits, 237 Sci. AM. 82, 82 (1977) ("The resulting increase in our ability to process
information amounts to an intellectual revolution."); Noyce, Microelectronics, 237 Sci. AM. 63,
63 (1977) ("[T]here has also been a true revolution; a qualitative change in technology, the
integrated microelectronic circuit, has given rise to a qualitative change in human capabili-
ties."); Terman, The Role of Microelectronics in Data Processing, 237 Sci. AM. 163 (1977).
With the idea that EFTS will be revolutionary, not gradually evolutionary (as Baxter,
Cootner & Scott would have it), most commentators-including EFTS' friends-agree. See,
e.g., M. BENDER, EFTS: ELECTRONIc FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM-ELEMENTS AND IMPACT 71
passim (1975); H. DUFF-Y & R. DUFFY, supra note 75, at x.
l16 0. DIAL & E. GOLDBERG, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND COMPUTERS 9 (1975).
"I See A. WESTIN & N. BAKER, supra note 110, at 14. The cost has declined more or less to
match. See M. WESSEL, FREEDOM'S EDGE: THE COMPUTER THREAT TO SOCIETY, at vii (1974).
38 See generally sources cited in note 135 supra.
M3 As I shall argue later, it not only can, but, absent constraining legislation, probably will.
See pages 457-64 infra.
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B, Lender C, Taxing Authority D, Employer E and so on. In a
currency-based payments system each of those entities captures by
virtue of the transaction only the data which relate to it, plus what-
ever information it can acquire from the individual by manual trans-
mission such as tax returns and loan applications. The administrator
of the payments mechanism in a currency-based system captures vir-
tually no data at all; the U.S. Treasury may have records of the
quantities of currency in circulation and may know something of the
velocity of money in general, but it knows nothing of any particular
transaction. When one shifts from currency to checks the matter
changes in a fundamental way. Each transaction now involves three
parties-the payor, the payee, and a bank acting as the decentralized
administrator of the process, often simultaneously connected with
many of the payor's other transactions. Because the checks necessarily
carry certain transaction data,1 40 there is in this system at least one
party with the theoretical ability to deal in a coordinated way with
data from many discrete transactions. The limited amount of transac-
tion data captured with each check and the cost of utilizing the data
in an intelligent fashion, among other less important phenomena,
prevent this from occurring at the present time.
If and when such costs decline, by a factor of fifty to one, or one
hundred million to one, and when the net of connected participants
widens to include retailers (POS) as well as payors and payees, com-
munication among the individual's separate transaction partners be-
comes feasible. The degree of discreteness of transactions processed
through an EFT system may dissipate and the manager of the pay-
ments mechanism may become involved in a fashion resulting in the
communication of processable information about each and every
transaction141 -the possibility at least of the construction of dossiers
from analysis of receipts and payments.
To summarize briefly, each leap in the sophistication and con-
comitant decrease in cost142 of information technology has the poten-
"40 Checks can be cashed first, of course, but then the transaction would involve currency,
with a lower probability of data capture.
4I Moreover, given the changes in "real-time" information processing, EFTS permits the
active participation in the transaction of the payments method manager. EFTS permits the
interdiction of any and all transactions, for example, which the system manager might deter-
mine to be inappropriate, as well as permitting the central processing of transaction data and its
indexing (by merchant, by consumer, by product . . . ). While it is true that this is to some
extent the case at present-as in the case of the check combined with the telephone-the costs of
non-EDP communication are simply too high to make the payment system's activity within the
sale anything other than episodic and entirely reactive rather than ubiquitous and proactive.
142 Over the past three decades the cost of such computing power has declined, so that what
formerly would have cost several million dollars would have cost less than $1000 by 1974. By
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tial for expanding the amount of information both kept and used. 43
Increases in capability and decreases in cost of data analysis will
permit and encourage social scientists such as marketers to develop
increasingly refined predictive models of human behavior. 44  The
economic utility of data centrally captured and processed will increase
as the costs of collecting and analyzing the data, for example through
an adjunct to the payment-making system, decline; its availability as
a marketable good will become widely recognized and its collection
and use institutionalized. 45
This is hardly a difference in degree.
2. Privacy: Some Alternative Valuations
Little if any of this, according to the Baxter, Cootner and Scott
report, will significantly affect consumers' privacy interests. In addi-
tion to denying that EFTS holds any such qualitative potential, the
report presumes a future in which rivalrous nets will compete for
consumer business on the basis of the degree of privacy protection
offered. 14  Characteristically, however, the report's central thesis
about EFTS and privacy is that the only legitimate fear is not the
misuse of transaction data by private industry, but surveillance by
government agencies.147  There are a number of unkind things to be
said about that view, only one of which is that it follows naturally
from an a priori disposition that only government activity must be
limited. Another is that the failure to look at the system of EFT and
discuss ACH, DDP and PAD takes its toll again: if institutions that
allocate credit are also among the managers of the payments process,
1984 the same will have decreased to not more than $10, and perhaps below $1. See M. WESSEL,
supra note 137, at vi.
143 See Karst, supra note 124, at 361.
I Even in those areas and among those firms that have not exploited computational ability in
terms of an expanded scope of record-keeping, there seems nevertheless to have been an expan-
sion in the use of existing data, and an increase in the frequency and degree of institutional
sharing of data. See A. WESTIN & N. BAKER, supra note 110, at 280, 420-27, 441. One possible
explanation for the slow expansion rate in the amount of data collected (as opposed to the
intensity with which it is processed) is that the "inputing" cost remains labor-intensive and
therefore high. The EFTS matrix (POS/DDP in particular) will reduce this cost especially.
"I Some concrete examples might be offered, even though these details are not critical to the
point being made. Consider welfare recipients, most of whom now do not even maintain
demand deposit accounts. When and if a full DDP and PAD system is created, the mandatory
budgeting of expenditures is at least easily possible if not likely. Likewise, credit screening and
collection efforts directed toward any consumer can be honed to a fine point, with the increased
availability of transaction data. And, of course, the analysis of patterns of expenditures would be
enormously useful to any who would market their goods and services selectively.
1,6 A fairy tale, I believe. See discussion at pages 461-64 infra.
' BC&S at 170.
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the possibilities for increased degrees of control are simply too obvious
to ignore. There are, that is to say, real possibilities for functional
consequences effected by nongovernmental entities. 48
It is not germane to the methodological focus of this Article to
dwell any further on this latter point, though it is an important caveat
for those who would take the report's counsel. The point here is more
narrowly focused. Baxter, Cootner and Scott conclude that legislation
protecting privacy is unnecessary as EFT systems come into being.
That conclusion is troubling, even granting nearly all of their assump-
tions. The problem again lies in the behavioral model. The report
implies that privacy is important only instrumentally; that if collected
data cannot be acted upon so as to directly affect a subject, no loss has
been incurred; 141 and that, moreover, if no such functional effects can
be seen, there is even less reason to consider seriously whether the
natural economic evolution of EFTS might better be guided by judi-
cious regulation.
The task once again is to refine the psychological suppositions of
the model. That privacy is a good valued solely for its prophylactic
effect against the regulation of individual conduct is rather a sparse
conception, and a view confuted by a rich history of humanist litera-
ture, if not by the empirical sciences directly. Two particular discrete
though related values served by privacy can be suggested. One is the
value to be derived from assuming responsibility for one's self. The
other is the need to escape from the noninstrumental judgment of
others; to find a "place to be, rather than always to be respectable."
The first of these two components of privacy is the more difficult
to capture neatly. It begins with the recognition of a common human
need to reject determinism and to put in its place an area of being that
is marked deeply by the possibility of choice, and responsibility. 150
This is close to but subtler than the debate between free will and
14S Not only is it true that information is a sine qua non of effective "control," it is also the case
that institutionalization of data collection at a minimum symbolizes a perimeter of the de facto
"authority" of the collector. See page 432 supra.
' Nowhere does the report say this explicitly. The implications are diffused. (At one point,
for example, they say that "only the government could create the monolithic control machine of
... Orwell's 1984. ... BC&S at 166.) The reader of the report will of course judge whether
my attribution is reasonable.
" One example, albeit the extreme statement of the case, is Sartre's Ibietta, a character who
chose what he thought was death even after abandoning all reason for dying in a noble cause,
because only that choice would be an authentic assertion of his freedom and his identity. J.
SAIrRE, THE WALL, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM FROM DoSTOEVSKY TO SABTRE (W. Kaufmann
ed. 1964).
Sartre amplified this interpretation in his most famous lecture, EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMAN-
iSM, reprinted in id. at 287. "Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself.
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determinism, between Skinner and the "literati of dignity."' 51 It is,
rather, an underlying drive, an irreducible aspect of human personal-
ity that surfaces at choice moments, the need to assert that Skinner
simply must be wrong. (The need, if a flourish may be forgiven, to
deny the possibility of the pointlessness of existence.) Perhaps the most
eloquent expression of this good is that of Dostoevsky's man from the
underground: 152
[Y]ou say, that science itself will teach man . . . that he never has
really had any will or caprice of his own, and that he himself is
something of the nature of a piano-key, or the stop of an organ, and
that ... everything he does is not done by his willing it, but is done
of itself, by the laws of nature. Consequently we have only to
discover these laws of nature and man will no longer have to
answer for his actions and life will become exceedingly easy for
him. All human actions will then, of course, be tabulated accord-
ing to these laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms up to
108,000 and entered in an index....
I, for instance, would not be the least surprised if all of a sudden,
apropos of nothing, in the midst of general prosperity a gentleman
with an ignoble, or rather with a reactionary and ironical, counte-
nance were to arise and, putting his arms akimbo, say to us all: "I
say, gentlemen, hadn't we better kick over the whole show and
scatter rationalism to the winds, simply to send these logarithms to
the devil, and to enable us to live once more at our own sweet
foolish willl". . . [S]uch is the nature of man. . . . What has made
[you] conceive that man must want a rationally advantageous
choice? What man wants is simply independent choice, whatever
that independence may cost and wherever it may lead. ... And
although our life in this manifestation of it is often worthless, yet it
is life and not simply extracting square roots....
[E]ven if man really were nothing but a piano-key, even if this
were proved to him by natural science and mathematics, even then
he would not become reasonable, but would purposely do some-
thing perverse out of simple ingratitude, simply to gain his point!
[E]xistentialism . . . places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own
shoulders. [Id. at 291.] [Because] man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so
far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but
what his life is." Id. at 300.
151 See B.F. SINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). Skinner characterizes his analyti-
cal protagonist as the "Literature of Freedom." A more modern rehearsal of the debate has been
held between Wilson and Lewontin. See E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1976); THE SOCIOBIOLOCY
DEBATE (A. Caplan ed. 1978) (Lewontin is the leading detractor of genetic determinism.).
152 F. DosToEVsKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM FROM Dos-
TOEVSKY TO SARTRE 70, 71, 73, 75-76 (W. Kaufmann ed. 1964).
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He will launch a curse upon the world as only man can curse (it is
his privilege, the primary distinction between him and other ani-
mals), may be by his curse alone he will attain his object-that is,
convince himself that he is a man and not a piano-key! If you say
that all this, too, can be calculated and tabulated-chaos and
darkness and curses, so that the mere possibility of calculating it all
beforehand would stop it all, and reason would reassert itself, then
man would purposely go mad in order to be rid of reason and gain
his pointl I believe in it, I answer for it, for the whole work of man
really seems to consist in nothing but proving to himself every
minute that he is a man and not a piano-keyl 153
It may be bad empirical science to suggest that the resonance
implied by the durability of literature proves the existence of the
psychological dispositions that the literature portrays. It is not, how-
ever, illegitimate heuristic argument, and it may be that the behav-
ioral predicates of homo economicus are based on even less. In any
event, the connection between existential gnashing of teeth and the
subtler dimensions of privacy is firm, even if difficult to capture. It
may for example be a fear that one is a predictable algorithm and that
the possession of sufficient information will be, or will be regarded as,
equal to knowing all that he is. People tend to resent "I have you all
figured out," but bask in "You are an enigma." By remaining enig-
matic, unknown and private, one retains the possibility of asserting
that there is a unique and subjective identity. Privacy in this sense
means keeping undisclosed that information that might be sufficient
to endanger this existential need. An invasion of privacy puts at risk,
among many other things, the cloak that hides even from oneself what
Dostoevsky describes as a corrosive possibility. And that, the preserva-
tion of the cloak, is a value, even if not a good in an economist's terms.
The second and somewhat more palpable addition to the dimen-
sions of privacy is that of the freedom to escape judgment, to be for
one's self rather than for others. Through the retention of privacy
individuals are able selectively to conceal and to reveal of themselves,
and thereby to have some measure of control over others' perceptions
"s Sartre's EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM, supra note 150, at 302-03, makes the same point:
Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual . . . [T]his
theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does not
make man into an object. All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man
including oneself as an object-that is, a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way
different from the pattern of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a
chair or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of
values in distinction from the material world.
It is, finally, interesting to compare these observations with the experimental theses of Jack
Brehm. See pages 431-33 supra.
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and beliefs about them. 54  How we appear to others brings rewards
and punishments. Some are direct: people deal with us differently if
we are perceived to be this rather than that. Some are derivative: we
derive pleasure from believing that we are acting in a way, or being in
a way, that merits approbation from others. This may be only genetic
adaptation, to the degree that seeking approbation is an important
aspect of the sociality necessary for species survival. Yet acting for
others is, somehow, inauthentic. Escape from judgment, whatever its
etiology, is as much a motivational cause as is the need for approba-
tion. 5 Privacy is the ability to choose the optimal mixture of disclo-
sure and escape, to modulate in acceptable ways the drive to be and
the drive to be among others. The preservation of privacy serves to
protect an important source of perceived welfare.
As Justice Douglas might have said were he addressing EFTS
directly, a person is defined in a money-exchange society by what he
spends his money on. Arthur Miller did say it directly:
[A] modern bank record is like a roadmap of a man's life. It tells
where he has been, who he has seen and done any kind of business
with, who are the objects of his affection, what organizations and
charities he supports, what his hobbies are, almost what kind of
and how much beer he likes to drink .... 156
Even if it is fanciful to imagine that EFTS transactions would
somehow be scrutinized for deviations from the norm 1,7 these areas of
' Cf. E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 67 (1959). "If we see
perception as a form of contact and communion, then control over what is perceived is control
over contact that is made, and the limitation and regulation of what is shown is a limitation and
regulation of contact."
'5' See the survey data in A. WESTIN & N. BAKER, supra note 110, at 466-70.
' Amend the Bank Secrecy Act: Hearings on S. 3814 and S. 3828 Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 150-51 (1972).
Professor Miller's concern is especially well placed in the context of a centralized (or highly
interactive and communicating) payments mechanism. Moreover, as the National Academy of
Sciences Report concluded, EFTS will be able to capture such large quantities of personal data
that it will be too "inviting" to permit the nets to develop without legislation controlling access,
retention, and distribution. A. WESTIN & N. BAKER, supra note 110, at 278.
"' The vision is, of course, not entirely fanciful. See, e.g., NFS/RANN, supra note 5, at 200.
Cf. The Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 31 U.S.C.) (requiring the reporting by financial institutions of certain transactions
engaged in by the institutions' customers or clients). The regulations provide:
(a) Each financial instituion shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal,
exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial
institution, which involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000. ...
31 C.F.R. § 102.22(a) (1980).
. (c) This section shall not require reports by . . . (3) a commercial bank or trust
1981]
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the privacy field may nevertheless be confronted. A ubiquitous EFT
network will limit an individual's freedom to optimize his own disclo-
sure mix. As Wessel notes,158 the damage that comes from any possible
misuse of collected data may be less than the effect that comes from
just knowing that the data is being collected.
3. Autonomy, Dignity and the Social Accounts
Brehm, Dostoevsky, Sartre, Wessel and their intellectual kin
have identified components of human behavior that the heuristic
model of Baxter, Cootner and Scott ignores. Their invocation here
was not meant to suggest that the future of EFTS is necessarily an
unprecedented rape of the humanist dimensions of human personal-
ity. They do, however, provide possible explanations for what has
been described here as the central failure of the Baxter, Cootner and
Scott model-that its sanguine view of consumers' avid acceptance of
EFT systems seems to be false. Describing something as socially desir-
able because it is "good for consumers in terms of time and money"
demonstrates a narrow appreciation of those values that a social order
might be called upon to protect. To make the point more directly
methodological, the report's analytical regime has a model of con-
sumer preference as its input and a set of policy recommendations as
its output. In between the two there is an unstated axiom of the
discipline: since unregulated market forces usually conduce toward
the optimal satisfaction of consumers' desires for economic goods, an
industrial development which will serve those desires should be left to
unregulated market forces. A later section of this Article will offer
some caveats about that axiom, some reasons for suspecting that it
may not hold for such noneconomic goods.159  The point here is an
company organized under the laws of any State or of the United States with respect
to overland shipments of currency or monetary instruments shipped to or received
from an established customer maintaining a deposit relationship with the bank, in
amounts which the bank may reasonably conclude do not exceed amounts commen-
surate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or profession of the
customer concerned . ...
Id. § 102.23(c)(3) (emphasis added).
The statute also permits the Secretary of the Treasury to share these reports "for a purpose
consistent with the provisions of this chapter [with] any other department or agency of the
Federal Government on the request of the head of such department or agency." 31 U.S.C. § 1061
(1976). The uses of the reports, presumably, are limited to "criminal, tax, or regulatory investi-
gations or proceedings." Id. § 1051.
15 M. WESSELL, supra note 137, at 30.
"5 The axiom is indispensable to the school of analysis which Baxter, Cootner & Scott
represent. Consider, for example, the definition of "efficiency" offered by another member of
[Vol. 2:397
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elaboration of what those goods may be-a critique of the input
model.
Dignity is a word that comes to mind. It embraces a great
deal-positive self-regard, a realization of autonomy, an inward re-
flection of the regard of others. Central to it is the notion of "matter-
ing." Externally this means to be regarded as being individually con-
sequential; to be respected as being responsible; to matter as a being
even in nonfunctional ways and to be seen as caring about choosing.
Internally it means a sense of sharing in the control of one's own
environment,1 0 for which patent autonomy is a necessary if insuffi-
cient condition. Relations among people and between individuals and
their social order generate utility or values just as do the acquisition
and consumption of goods.' 6 ' To move from this tenet to its policy
implications it is not necessary to argue the biochemistry of human
dignity with Skinner or the other instrumentalists. It is enough for
now to observe not that the desire for dignity is good or real, but only
that, like desires for gold and gelfilte fish, it is.162
the tradition: "exploiting economic resources in such a way that 'value'-human satisfaction as
measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services-is maximized." R.
POsNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 10 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in original).
This suggests that either of two things must be true: Either (1) "efficiency" is an insufficient
criterion for regulatory policy; or (2) all "'values" which the legal order should count are
adequately measured by "aggregate ... willingness to pay . . . . Id.
'O0 See my earlier discussion of the same concept, in a very different context, i.e., in analyzing
the nonfunctional values of due process:
It is the value of autonomy, of controlling the events that affect you, even (if
someone insists) the value of the sharing in control-and the respect and self-respect
that come with it. From the social perspective (the value to all of each sharing) it is
the value of civility-a necessary condition of exchanges of respect or, perhaps, the
geometric product of those exchanges. It is the value of human dignity.
Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique for Professor
Johnson and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 116, 148-49 (1973) (footnotes omitted). The
point was later expanded by Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due
Process, 18 Nomos 126, 127-28 (1977):
[A] participatory opportunity may also be psychologically important to the
individual: to have played a part in, to have made one's apt contribution to,
decisions which are about oneself may be counted important even though the
decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable and one's efforts
have not proved influential.
See id. at 154 n.4 (citing Dauer & Gilhool, supra).
'61 Goods, strictly speaking, are themselves often valued for the relational consequences
caused by their ownership. The utility of an ostentatiously expensive automobile, for example,
lies almost wholly in the social approbation its owner believes it commands.
"62 There is at the time of this writing a bill in the United States Congress styled the Privacy of
Electronic Fund Transfers Act of 1979, S. 1929 & H.R. 5560, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Most
of the bill's sections deal with disclosure of EFT transactions to law enforcement authorities, and
the procedure by which disclosure can be had (with a special proviso, § 107(c), for the Secret
Service). Section 103(a) is more general. It would forbid disclosure by any EFTS participant of
the contents of any item, including its existence, location, date, time, contents, effect or mean-
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V. RECALCULATING THE ECONOMICS OF EFTS
This critique of the Baxter, Cootner and Scott report promised to
be a three-pronged affair. The first, a scrutiny of the behavioral
predicates of their analysis, has been completed and can temporarily
be laid aside. The second, and the subject of the present section, is an
examination of the report's most general conclusion that, with respect
to most of the critical policy choices presented by EFTS, the social
benefits to be derived can be maximized by the natural forces of
unfettered markets, or distorted by the intrusion of government regu-
lation. The third is the linkage between the first and second, the
"equilibrium" of the method.163 That, the last, lies nearer the heart
of the matter, although it requires the preparation of the present
section before its dynamics become accessible." 4 These pages are
therefore less digression than sorbet, a pause that connects two other
methodological courses.
Baxter, Cootner and Scott's response to the issue of consumer
privacy exemplifies 6 5 the market-competition texture of their anal-
ysis. The following juxtaposition of excerpts captures a wide segment
of their views: 166
First and foremost, [EFTS'] adoption and use will be a matter of
individual choice, not fiat. To the extent that people find EFTS
advantageous . . . they will use it; to the extent they don't, they
will avoid it .... [T]he larger stores and the larger account holders
will comprise the bulk of the EFTS market. [N]umerically they are
in the minority .... The spectre of complete EFTS control over all
transactions is indeed an exercise in pure imagination, unsullied by
reality. The person who is especially concerned about the greater
privacy vulnerability of EFTS, if that turns out to exist at all, will
simply handle a particular transaction or transactions in general as
at present, with a check or cash....
ing. The exceptions, other than the government access of §§ 104 and 107, require "specific
authorization" of the payee or originator and (§ 108) notice to the individual affected that the
disclosure was made.
The bill has a number of substantial difficulties yet to be resolved; its chance of passage in
the current session is slim. It was, however, introduced. It will very likely be introduced in the
97th Congress as well.
163 See discussion at page 406 supra.
164 It is addressed in section VI infra.
I do not harp on their treatment of privacy again because it is their weakest point. I do it
here because, so far as consumer protection issues are concerned, it is their only point. See
discussion at pages 407-08 supra.
16 The first two paragraphs are from BC&S at 167; the third is from id. at 169. In between is
their general discussion of "problems of unauthorized access." The discussion on page 167
includes a point labelled "third"-one already examined here-viz, that "[s]earch costs will
remain an operative and often prohibitive constraint." See pages 434-37 supra.
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Second, our prior analysis of scale economies has suggested that a
natural and competitive course of EFTS development will lead to
an overlapping series of rival networks. . . . So, the instantaneous
monitoring of [those citizens who make] use of EFTS for payments
purposes, is also an unreal prospect. Indeed . . . one of the signifi-
cant advantages of rivalrous private systems is that they will com-
pete in offering degrees of privacy at prices corresponding roughly
to their cost ...
The main pitfall to be avoided . . . is legislation attempting to
prescribe a level of security or mandating the security measures to
be adopted or the technology to be used. The legislature has no way
of knowing what level of security is "proper" for each set of cus-
tomers, information and uses. . . . In a competitive EFTS environ-
ment, system operators will have continuing incentives to search
out security levels and improved technology that correspond to the
security needs and values of their customers. 167
Three distinct assertions can be distilled from this, for separate
analysis. First, if EFT becomes a nationwide system, it will comprise
a large enough number of independent overlapping nets to behave
competitively. Second, each net will compete for consumer business
by specifying the degree of privacy or security that it offers, and the
price. Third, in no event would an EFT grid, rivalrous or monolithic,
preclude the use of non-EFT payments methods. "The combined
effect of these natural limits on private EFTS should put privacy
concerns into a more realistic perspective; the adoption of such sys-
tems will not deliver us to the doorstep of 1984."1B
A. The Number of Nets
One immediate qualification of the view that EFTS will com-
prise competing-"rivalrous"-overlapping nets, is that Baxter and
company's discussion addressed the problem as if the nets would
provide only POS services. They left out ACH and the consumer-af-
fecting pieces of the system-PAD and DDP especially-that ACH
will likely foster, and assumed that no network connections between
POS and these others would occur or would affect the calculations.
They might not so easily have reached their conclusion regarding
rivalry without this segregation: ACH's are presently operating in a
number of markets and no market has more than one ACH switch.1 69
167 Baxter, Cootner & Scott's own footnote at this point reads in part, "If EFTS is forced into a
regulated utility mode, these incentives will be significantly blunted." BC&S at 172 n. 17.
161 BC&S at 168. To be perfectly accurate about the implied "therefore" of this sentence, see
note 166 supra.
119 NCEFT FINAL, supra note 3, at 213. While this may be attributable to the fact that with
only two exceptions all ACHs are operated by the Federal Reserve Bank, it nevertheless supports
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The analysis applies, therefore, solely to a POS-only system, 70 should
there ever be such a thing.
Baxter, Cootner and Scott attempted to determine the number of
nets that could be supported by present levels of retail activity. They
looked first at the number of POS terminals that would "nearly ex-
haust" the economies of scale of a single net. They then established the
number of terminals that existing retail volumes would most likely
cause to be installed. By dividing the former into the latter, and after
computing the numerator on the basis of a series of low-bias assump-
tions, they predicted a nationwide installation of at least forty
nets.' 71 When the number of POS terminals per net was calculated
on the basis of high-bias assumptions the number of nets172 increased
to 139.173
the NCEFT's view that the economies of scale of ACH do not justify more than one switch
anywhere.
"70 There is a second qualification: Baxter, Cootner & Scott's conclusion from their net-count-
ing foray is that there will be sufficient competition to make unjustified anti-concentration
regulation. BC&S at 106-14. This may be a non sequitur. Even assuming that they are right in
projecting rivalry among two or three (or even more) nets in any one area, it does not follow
inexorably that such regulation is contraindicated. Baxter, Cootner & Scott are quite clear about
their preferences in this regard: antitrust policy should constrain concentration only after nearly
all economies of scale have been exploited; the law's purpose is to preclude the output constric-
tion and attendant price rises and productive diseconomies that concentration causes. But some
commentators have rather more expansive views of the virtues of atomized competition. See,
e.g., the discussion of "nonefficiency values" in antitrust policy in Brodley, Potential Competi-
tion Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 33-40. (1977).
171 BC&S at 105.
172 The calculated results for numbers of nets that various states could support are the
following. First, using a high bias in the calculations:
No. of nets: <1 <2 <3 <6 <10 <25
No. of states: 10 16 23 36 41 all
And, using the low bias:
No. of nets: <1 <2 <3 <6
No. of states:. 37 43 47 all
BC&S at 106, 107, 111.
Baxter, Cootner & Scott compute both the high and low figures, I believe, for the reason
that they wish to emphasize two seemingly inconsistent assertions: even at the lowest number of
nets likely to be installed (40), there will be sufficient competiton to preclude any need for
public-utility type regulation; yet even at the highest (139) there will not be enough nets to allow
actual competition within most states and market areas so long as the present proscriptions on
interstate banking persist. In other words, without their really being obvious about the point,
their second conclusion is a condition of the first. It is therefore fair to read it in its contrapositive
form: so long as we have restrictions on interstate banking, even the high estimate will not be
enough to insure effective rivalry in most areas of the country. There is a point to be made even
short of this, however, for Baxter, Cootner & Scott really want to assert that even at the lowest
possible estimate there will be 40 competing nets, and this is sufficient to generate adequate
rivalry if (and only if) the interstate rules are repealed.
Id. at 110-11.
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Although the number forty was derived by indulging assump-
tions hostile to the thesis of stable competition, 174 an objection remains
to be resolved. Recall that the denominator of the fraction is the
number of POS terminals that would nearly exhaust a single net's
economies of scale. This number, 50,000 terminals per net, was cho-
sen because, on the basis of unrevealed proprietary data, it is at
50,000 terminals per net that the net operator's "elasticity of cost"
would decline to the range of -0.05 to -0.10.175
To say that graphically, 50,000 terminals served in any one unit
of time is a quantity on the still-declining slope of the net operator's








Baxter, Cootner and Scott assume, correctly I believe, that in the
short run a firm can maximize its profits by producing at a rate-serv-
ing that number of nets--at which the average total cost curve (ATC)
171 Id. at 101.
17s By "elasticity of cost" BC&S mean the change in average total cost for each additional unit
of production. If increasing output causes no change in per-unit costs, then the elasticity of
dC/dQ is zero. See BC&S at 101.
176 Id.
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is at its minimum, and where, therefore, its slope equals zero. Simi-
larly, in a long run equilibrium the firm should have adjusted its fixed
and variable costs by choosing that output at which the minimum on
the long run average total cost (LRATC) curve equals the price at
which the output can be sold. The problem with this unobjectionable
calculus is that there is little reason to believe that firms really do or
will operate at those outputs just to the left of or at the bottom of the
ATC saucer on the preceding diagram; that is, where MC = ATC,
and where dP/dQ = 0.
First off, not all, perhaps not even most, ATC curves are parab-
olas. In the short run it is equally likely for any given industry or firm
that its ATC curve will be broad and flat rather than narrow and
U-shaped. 77 In manufacturing, for example, variations in the utili-
zation of fixed capacity as wide as 20% to 90 % typically do not
exhibit rising marginal costs and, therefore, show no increases in ATC
either. That gives the ATC saucer a big fat bottom rather than a
nicely rounded one.
The long run case is even more important. It is not entirely
certain that long run ATC curves have rising portions, for if they do it
is only because at some extreme scale the administrative burdens of
the enterprise become perverse.178 The owner of a firm of twice the
optimal size can reduce its scale by dividing it into two firms of
exactly optimal size. Therefore LRATC curves may not, within broad
limits, ever have positive slopes. As Bain expressed it:
[T]here is apparent no automatic tendency for costs to rise with still
greater scale. Once all economies of increasing scale have been
exploited, costs should tend to remain constant in the face of fur-
ther expansion unless some other factor intervenes.179
And, putting this together with the observation about adminis-
trative economies,
Since the output at which diseconomies of large-scale management
are encountered may well be beyond that at which the economies
of large-scale production are fully exploited, it is clear that this
U-shaped curve may in many cases have a long flat bottom, repre-
senting a substantial range of output over which unit costs [in the
long run] are invariant.8 0
'" J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 105-06 (1952).
170 Id. at 113.
, ' Id. at 112.
180 Id. at 117.
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So long as the price it fetches is equal to or greater than its average
total costs, a firm can continue to increase its output. And maybe it
will.
Finally, from the perspective of optimal long run planning, firms
will try to adjust their long run factors and plan their output in such a
way as to set the long run marginal cost equal to the selling price. In
the following diagram, the firm will increase its output "so long as
price is equal to or greater than its minimum average cost for the long
run. That is, at the price P2 it will build to a scale to produce the








All of which is to say that, even if Q1 were 50,000 terminals per
net and the elasticity were approximately -0.05, we have no assurance
that Q, is what most firms would actually produce. Thus, while forty
nets are possible, that number is neither likely nor probable. If
Q2= 200,000 terminals, for example, there would be only ten nets.
And that would change things drastically. 182
M Id. at 142.
182 Even if all of this is wrong or trivial, there remains a serious objection to the Baxter,
Cootner & Scott style. Their entire analysis here focused on horizontal concentration.
Horizontal concentration is not the only troublesome phenomenon. Even if there were to be
several rivalrous nets, and even if EFTS were capable of coexisting with other forms and systems
of value transfer, there might nevertheless be "vertical" concentrations to be addressed. In
particular, I refer to the concentration of consumer financial and credit transactions within a
relatively small number of institutions.
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The uncertainties of the theory, even apart from its too-imperfect
empirical validation, are unsettling; more so, when public policy
hangs in the balance.
B. Competition and Differentiation
The report assumes that so long as there are competitors, there
will be competition; and that in their quest for consumer allegiance
rivalrous EFTS nets will behave like soap companies-the industry or
even individual firms within it will offer differentiated products to
satisfy differentiated consumer demand.'1 3  As to security and prob-
lems of unauthorized access,
It is the case, for example, that "[miost individuals rely far more on merchants than they do
on financial institutions in establishing the short-term credit relations that have become part of
their life patterns." NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 26. Therefore, at the present time the retail
credit market is highly diffuse; consumers' indebtedness for both minor and major transactions is
held very widely among retail merchants, banks, thrift companies, and other credit sources.
And, from the other side, retail merchants presently incur the cost of credit risk and the cost of
capital employed in carrying their customers' accounts. As credit/debit cards achieve increasing
degrees of penetration, there is reason to suspect that the payments system operator will capture
larger shares of this market.
There is some evidence that, with the advent of credit cards, this transition has already
begun. The following data deal with revolving credit and imply that the trend is for credit
business to shift away from retail merchants and towards the issuers of bank credit cards.
Revolving Credit (Billions)
Year Bank Card Credit Retail Store Credit
1970 $ 6.8 6.1% $15.9 14.2%
1971 $ 8.4 6.8% $16.4 13.2%
1972 $10.4 7.6% $17.1 12.5%
1973 $13.9 8.8% $19.1 12.1%
1974 $17.1 10.9% $20.3 12.9%
1975 $20.4 12.4% $20.3 12.4%
1976 $25.9 13.4% $21.9 11.3%
NCEFT FINAL, supra note 3, at 126, Table 8.7.
As to all installment credit (revolving and fixed-term) during the same period of 1970 to
1976, the share held by retailers dropped from 13.4% to only 10.3% of the total market, while
commercial banks increased their share from 44.6% to 48.2%. Id. at 122-25.
These tendencies can be expected to accelerate, especially in the light of Baxter, Cootner &
Scott's assertion that retail store credit is offered to attract high time cost customers. Because,
that is to say, retail stores offer credit arrangements to facilitate sales to high time cost (thus, on
the Baxter, Cootner & Scott measure, high income) nonshopping-and most credit-worthy-
consumers, gravitation of the credit/payment function to banks through POS or other debit/cash
cards will leave retailers with the lower socioeconomic status and less creditworthy debtors and
will moot the reason for granting credit in the first place.
"83 At one point even Baxter, Cootner & Scott suggest a weakness in this sanguine view.
Whether they truly regard it as a weakness or merely as an opportunity to toss a bone is not clear.
They say, following the observations quoted in the text:
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[The] parties are all linked together in contractual relationships, so
the shifting of responsibility among them by agreement, if not
blocked by ill-advised legal provisions, should assist in arriving at
efficient solutions.
The normal working of contract rules and negligence doctrine
is likely to produce such a set of arrangements .... "ll
And as to privacy and problems of authorized access,
To some critics, among the foremost dangers presented by EFTS is
that it will enable the financial profiles of account holders to be
opened to commercial exploitation by the bank or affiliated enter-
prises. The extent to which that will be so depends on the terms of
the agreement between customer and bank. At present . . . that
agreement is left to custom and implication ...
The answer would seem to lie in a clearer, explicit specifica-
tion in the. . . agreement regarding access to and use of data ....
If substantial numbers of people do in fact strongly object . . .
banks in competing for their patronage should find it worthwhile
to offer to exclude them from [the commercial distribution of ac-
count data]. 8 5
There are some unexpressed analytical premises buried here. The
report fails to specify its view of a number of variables that play a role
in channeling producers' behavior through consumers' preferences,
such as how the "normal working of contract" is likely to work in the
case of EFTS, and how one calculates the critical volume at which
differentiation becomes possible. Perhaps the mechanisms are too
elementary to require citation. Perhaps, on the other hand, the prem-
ises were all articulated: Parties left free to contract will do so; their
agreements will cover all those areas of concern to either or both and
will, in the aggregate, produce efficient solutions; producers' and
consumers' activities, when left to contractual determination, are
therefore wholly collaborative. 86
If legislatures are unable to resist the temptation to intervene in this area, their
efforts would best be directed at assuring that customers are afforded a set of options
regarding data use among which they can make explicit choices. Different options
would, of course, impose different costs on the network, and the operator should be
permitted to charge appropriate cost differentials.
BC&S at 169.
184 Id. at 168-69.
" Id. at 169 (footnotes omitted).
186 The ambiguity in the discussion of competition and differentation is inherent in the report.
It seems that Baxter, Cootner & Scott are suggesting that competition among EFTS producers
will drive them to offer differentiated products (i.e., more or less privacy, more or less security)
to consumers who value the differences differently. It is that interpretation to which I am
19811
HeinOnline  -- 2 Cardozo L. Rev.  451 1980 - 1981
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
This sanguine view of the potential of contract is a universal
solvent. Its structure is a set of observations-postulates actually-
about how producers and consumers interact. It is, like the behavioral
model of which it partakes, a thin though potent broth with little
texture-the beginning, perhaps, of that optimal mixture of observa-
tion and theory that signifies a mature science.
Even assuming that there may be "competitive" nets,18 7 it does
not necessarily follow that EFTS will present no serious consumer
issues. There is no undue concentration in the toy industry, yet there
are terribly unsafe toys. There is a great deal of competition among
automobile dealers, yet, for most purchasers, there is no sub-market
for no-repossession contract clauses. Both of these examples involve
dimensions of the contractual matrix that, unlike price, quantity, and
color, do not arise until long after the haggling ends. Imagining that
EFTS providers will compete over, for example, speed in correcting
errors, is reminiscent of the purported competition among consumer
product manufacturers whose warranty terms were sealed in the box
until after the sale. Whether there is one net or forty-two is only
partly relevant if consumers, as a practical matter, 188 do not assess and
choose the contract's terms at a time early in the relationship; if they
do not, the incentive for suppliers to differentiate diminishes signifi-
cantly.
This may be particularly true in the case of banks. Try an experi-
ment: Select any city; collect the application forms from all of the
banks issuing credit cards (typically, Mastercharge and Visa). Com-
pare the terms of their contracts as to their structural and legal
dimensions: Do Visa and Mastercharge differ, whether offered by the
same or by different banks? Are there differences among banks issuing
either of the cards? Do banks advertise and compete on the basis of
such differences among their card systems? The answers in New Ha-
ven are No, No, and No. What, in the method, would predict such
counter-theoretical results? Ptolemy needs another epicycle.
Because EFTS is a system of communications and information
processing, connecting of necessity payors and payees widely remote,
responding and it is that about which they are unclear. How will that differentiation occur?
What will it look like and how firm could it be? I don't know. (I don't think it will happen that
way at all.) Moreover, they are not always entirely clear about their own views. If it is not their
view that differentiation will occur, it must be that the pressure of competition will result in a
single "optimal" mixture of openness and privacy, offered at a single cost. That, of course, is
even worse. See discussion at pages 4681 infra.
' Baxter, Cootner & Scott suggest that even one net will behave competitively. Its competi-
tors will be the pre-existing cash and check systems. BC&S at 117.
188 The practical obstacles are the subject of a later discussion. See pages 469-73 infra.
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there are some things which all participants in the system simply must
have in common. Much as one cannot receive an FM radio broadcast
with an AM receiver,189 one cannot participate in a regional EFT
system without having compatible hardware and information for-
mats. The degree of system differentiation (hence effective competi-
tion) is in this way somewhat constrained. Even if it is practical to
interconnect many different kinds of hardware to provide differenti-
ated EFT services, the economies, and therefore the rigidities, of
having all POS stations and depository institutions using similar
procedures and formats may lead to a functional sameness despite the
fact that some terminals are red and square and others blue and
round. There is, in fact, activity at present regarding the setting of
standards for EFTS numbering systems, message formats, and stand-
ardized invoices and billing systems. 190 It is even now an issue as to
how much of the data-capture-and-transmission process should be
subject to industry standards and how much should be within the
discretion of the individual EFT-producing institution.'9" There are
no obvious answers; certainly the acid wash of competition suggests
none.
Perhaps this competition model of analysis works well on fungi-
ble commodities with price and output as the only variables, but not
so well when the attributes of the commodity grow any more com-
plex.
Technological mandates such as these may be, however, among
the lesser of the forces tending toward standardization of services,
terms, and operations: technological problems are often amenable to
technological solutions. A more important dimension is the eco-
nomic-how much will it cost to tailor-make an input or an output,
to differentiate among consumer preferences, to bargain out a
plethora of different contracts such as has never yet been accom-
plished in banking? Here the report asserts rather than analyzes. Like
the careless anthropologist whose method inadvertently stuffs abo-
rigine culture into European categories, the simple theory of competi-
tion-forcing-producers-to-satisfy-consumers fails to take full account
of the intrinsic dynamics of its subject.
C. Financial Autocatalysis: The Dynamics of Crowding the Pond
The analytical menu of the report does not include in its discursus
on the virtues of competition the possibility of a positive feedback
89 Even if they did operate on the same wavelength, which they do not.
.0 Personal correspondence. Some of the aspects of EFTS amenable to standardization are
reviewed in NCEFT Final, supra note 3, at 175-78, passim.
'9' Id. at 174-80.
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loop-a phenomenon in which an organism's rate of growth is either
zero or exponential. A large number of algal species can happily share
a pond, each precluded by the competition of the others from domi-
nating the available space-a democratic equilibrium. A single spe-
cies, through some chance occurrence, may gain a small edge in size
or niche. It can sometimes happen that if the change is sufficient, just
past some critical value, the new equilibrium in the pond will be one
of dominance.
Baxter, Cootner and Scott believe that technological implemen-
tations driven by advantages in costs are never precipitous. 9 2  EFTS
will not replace its predecessors; technologies coexist.19 3  When EFTS
expands to occupy some part of the pond now given to checks and
cash, it will do so gradually, as a result of atomistic consumer
choices. 19 4  The pond will never be full'9 5 of EFTS.98
Checks are currently used to effect about 90 % of the dollar
volume of all payment transactions. 9 7  It has been conservatively
estimated that by about 1992 EFT systems of one form or another will
capture at least 70 % of that volume. 98 From this one might con-
clude that, with a 30% residual volume left to checks, it is unlikely
that EFTS would ever exist without substantial competition from a
191 BC&S at 6.
1M3 To the extent that Baxter, Cootner & Scott see this slow evolution in the payments system
as a change in degree rather than in kind, what they are doing is "much like describing
present-day transcontinental communications as a further elaboration of the Pony Express." J.
RULE, supra note 20, at 24.
M94 Baxter, Cootner & Scott do believe that eventually EFTS will "probably eliminate much of
the actual writing of either checks or drafts," BC&S at 52, but insist that this market penetration
will be entirely a function of individual choice. Checks versus debit cards (POS), for example, is
seen as the choice by consumers of float versus time. The average float on a check is about 2.3
cents, "considerably less than 1 minute of time at even minimum wage rates. Even without some
price incentive by the merchant or bank, the majority of checks would be displaced by debit
cards." Id. at 55. I have already indicated some very serious doubts about the reality of such
calculations and need not reiterate them here. But even assuming that Baxter, Cootner & Scott
are right, so long as there are wide disparities in personal incomes there will be corresponding
disparities in the opportunity cost of time and therefore differences in how individuals value
"convenience" (time saving) over float or other things. Since producers cannot possibly accom-
modate individual tastes given the scale economies of interactive payments machinery, there is
likely to be some submerging of the minority by a system designed to serve the majority. See
discussion of this point at pages 466-68 infra.
115 BC&S at 167. Baxter, Cootner & Scott observe that "hundreds of thousands of stores will
make no use of EFTS." Id. Yet, at another point, they agree that those retail establishments that
will use EFTS account for 85-90% of all retail sales. Id. at 104, 108.
196 I could not resist the temptation of this metaphor. An eft is a newt, "any of various small
semiaquatic salamanders. ... WEasTEa's THIRD NEW INT'L DIcrIONAVR 1524 (unabr. 1976).
197 H. DUFFY & R. DUFFY, supra note 75, at 2.
19 NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 90-93. As to the nearer future, the report sees the following
with respect to POS:
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paper-based check clearing system. The report's assertion that EFTS
will increase rather than constrict choice is, therefore, apparently
confirmed.
Perhaps. But checks and check users are not wholly fungible.
Some checks are drawn by or are payable to individuals; others, to or
by businesses. It might be, for example, that an EFTS overall penetra-
tion of 70% could mean 100% capture of one market and 0% of
another. If that were the case, then a finding of competition from
alternative systems cannot be evidenced by the penetration data
alone. The differences are relevant, since the kinds of concerns and
values that this Article has explored and which it suggests that EFTS
might jeopardize, are the values of individuals.
The following is a breakdown-probably still more or less accu-
rate-of a sample of checks written in 1970: '9
Payees
Ind. Bus. Gov. Total
Individuals 3.6% 29.6% 1.8% 35.0%
Businesses 18.9 39.1 6.6 64.6Drawers Governments 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4
Total 22.8 68.8 8.4 100.0
How, then, might that 70% penetration be distributed? 200 Ac-
cording to one observer, business-to-business items will be the last to
be put on the EFTS line.20 1 If this is true, some 39 % of the items are
removed, leaving EFTS "capture" of its 70 % as a 100 % capture of the
items drawn by and to individuals. That, of course, is far too simple,
though it does show the proper trend. Business-to-business items are





Id. at 313. Part of the difficulty in predicting the future of EFTS is precisely the point at issue in
the BC&S report; what controls the public will impose is not at all settled.
'" A.D. LiTTLE, INC., THE OUTLOOK FOB THE NATION'S CHECK PAYMENTS SYSTEMS: 1970-
1980, at 55 (1970) (Report to the American Bankers Association).
20 Of course, there is no technological barrier to an EFTS penetration of 100%, rather than
only 70%. I use the latter figure, however, as a conservative estimate of the next decade's
penetration.
201 13 FEDERAL RFSERVE BANK OF BOSTON CONFERENCE SERIES 145 (1974) (remarks of R. Kerr).
1981]
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often variable in amount, variable in occurrence, and trivial in cost
compared to the other expenses involved in clearing an account.
Nevertheless some business-to-business checks, such as those issued
and received by utilities, insurance companies, periodic financial
transactors, and regular suppliers or distributors, could be taken over
if not by POS, then by a variant of DDP and PAD. Thus some
business-to-business items will be included. Just as clearly, most of the
individual-to-individual items will likely be excluded.
Focusing directly on items as to which individuals are either
payors or payees gives a more detailed view: 20 2
* Individuals-to-business: about 25 % of these checks are drawn
to "recurrent" creditors such as utilities and are therefore fit for
ACH/PAD. Another 40 % are for retail purchases, thus POS-prone.
Fifteen percent are for other services and are therefore questionable.
The balance are for cash, contributions, and the like. Thus of the
items in this category, at least 65 % and perhaps over 80 % are imme-
diate candidates for EFTS.
* Individuals-to-governments: there are no data readily available
to show what portion of these items are semi-recurring (property
taxes; driver's license fees; other periodic assessments) and which are
entirely nonrecurring (parking fines; purchased services).
* Business-to-individuals: these items are very largely wages and
dividends or other recurring distributions and are therefore excellent
candidates for DDP or other ACH processing.
* Governments-to-individuals: almost all, various forms of wel-
fare and social security, disability, salaries, etc., are amenable to
DDP.
To summarize, it would be reasonable to surmise that, at a 70 %
penetration across the board, the bulk of the remaining check usage
will not be items related to individuals. Of the checks that individuals
receive, about 90 % are amenable to DDP. Of those that individuals
write, at least 65-80 % can be effected through very simple forms of
PAD and/or POS. The balance, such as the individual-to-individual
category, are systemically trivial.20 3 Although these data support the
supposition that EFTS will not become an exclusive payments system
202 These and the immediately following data are adapted from A.D. LITTLE, INC., supra note
199, at 64, Table 5-9. See also II GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ATLANTA PAYMENTS
PROJECT, A TECHNICAL, MARKETING, ORGANIZATIONAL AND COST EVALUATION OF A POINT-OF-
SALE TERMINAL SYSTEM, at 166 (1972) [hereinafter cited as APP/GIT PHASE IV).
"I Though, it must be conceded, these items are among the most sensitive in privacy-invasion
terms.
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in the near future, the possibility that EFTS could be ubiquitous so far
as individuals are concerned is not so farfetched. 204
Thus far, what EFTS could do. The more serious question is,
what it is likely to do.
A principal attraction of EFT for retail merchants is its potential
for reducing losses due to theft of cash, fraud and the collection costs
associated with checks.205 Of some, though less, importance are pro-
jected savings in handling costs of paper through on-line data capture.
Similar potential savings have instigated action by the federal govern-
ment. As the issuer of payroll, welfare, and other social insurance
payments, the government incurs considerable costs in handling and
processing checks, and from fraud and thefts. Moreover, the Federal
Reserve Board, as manager of the check-clearing system, is concerned
204 The form of argument employed here is a weak one-it uses as a proof the reconstruction
of a conclusion that may have been arrived at through a wholly different process. The analytic
point nevertheless remains: an EFTS penetration rate far lower than 100% could imply an
EFTS monopoly in some submarkets, depending upon how the actual rate is distributed. A low
overall rate does not mean that conflicting systems compete in all nonfungible arenas or for all
participants.
There is also the question of the residual use of cash, and once again the data cut both ways.
Baxter, Cootner & Scott assert that the use of cash for payments made by individuals may very
well increase under EFTS, simply because AFM's will make cash easier to get. BC&S at 68. That
some residual use of cash is inevitable finds support in other data as well. Indeed, during the
decade in which credit cards made their largest advance in market share, 1960-1970, the total
amount of cash in circulation per capita grew at a compounded rate of 4 %, just below the rate
of inflation during the same period. (During that same period the number of $100 bills outstand-
ing grew by 122%; $50 bills increased in number by 87.3%; and $20 bills by 89.6%. NSF/
RANN, supra note 5, at 47-48.) Although cash transactions are in number the largest segment of
all payment forms, the total value of all cash transactions is a small fraction of the total effected
by all payment media. NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 35. It would be equally interesting to note
the kinds of transactions that are concluded by the use of cash-i.e., are they the trivial
purchases of newspapers, shoeshines and lunch? Or do people use cash for larger, more signifi-
cant transactions as well? Consider the following: there is, on the average, about $500 in
currency outstanding for each individual adult in the United States, or a total of about $80
billion, of which 90% is in bills and 10% is in coin. Anderson, Currency in Use and in Hoards,
NEW ENCLAND EcoN. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 21, 28. Of this total, about two-thirds is in
savings hoards. Id. at 25. (This is about 7% of total personal income. In 1913, 10% of personal
income was held in currency. Id. at 21.) Only one-third is in active use. Holdings are even
smaller ($100 to $200 per household) for those households that have demand deposit accounts. It
is, nevertheless, extremely difficult to determine the uses to which this currency is put. Only
about $1 billion of the $80 billion (or the $27 billion in active use) is used in retail sales
transactions. Id. at 22-23. What the balance is used for is not known, though one speculation is
illegal transactions of various kinds. The point remains: cash is, though still a measurable
residuum, in terms of value a small portion of total payments.
201 See IV APP/GIT PHASE III, supra note 6, at 260 ("Generally, merchants realize the
existence of bad check losses and collection problems and welcome a solution to these problems."
Id.).
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with the additional maintenance costs incurred from its check han-
dling systems, processing the actual checks, and "float. 2 °6
The federal government has, therefore, been playing a signifi-
cant role in the early implementation of EFTS. The nature of that
role foretells something of EFTS' future.
Administrators of federal and state government payment distri-
bution systems have been persuading employees and welfare recipi-
ents to have their payments deposited directly into their demand or
time deposit accounts-a procedure likely to grow more pervasive if
the nation increases the scope and coverage of its wealth transfer
programs.20 7  The FRB has candidly noted: "[T]he U.S. government
...is looking toward the time when all of its checks will be handled
electronically and credited to the accounts of payees. '-2 0 8
It is reasonable to assume that, at least so far as ACH/DDP/PAD
is concerned, the eventual marketplace outcome will be skewed by
these governmental activities. That is not to say that such a result
would be economically irrational. It is, simply, to say that the propo-
nents of EFTS have begun with one very large and very important
customer who both subsidizes certain aspects of the costs and risks of
EFTS implementation, and who can in a variety of ways cause other
market participants, the recipients of its payments, to support the
effort. It is this latter aspect especially that illuminates not only the
degree of future penetration of EFTS, but the inescapability of the
system as well .20
211 See, e.g., Burke, RCPC's Transitional Step, Bus. REV., Jul.-Aug. 1973, at 11-13 (Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco publication). The "float" on Fed as well as the 'paper glut"
caused by checks were the ostensible motivations for the recent amendments to Federal Reserve
Bank Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1980). See Community Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 500
F.2d 282, 284-85 (9th Cir. 1974). This fear of the "paper mountain" has, now eight years later,
not been borne out. Some believe it never was the principal motivation for EFTS. See note 212
infra.
217 See, e.g., NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 101, 116-18.
208 Electronic Funds Transfer Moratorium Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 245 Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1975) (Statement of George W. Mitchell, Vice Chairman, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System) (emphasis added).
It is, therefore, not surprising that the Federal Reserve Bank is not only heavily involved in
the ACH system but is, in all but two cases, its operator. NCEFT INTEFIM, supra note 3, at 68-70.
As the NCEFT INTmUa report makes clear, however, it is not likely that Fed's involvement with
ACH foretells an equal involvement with POS. For one thing the Government (and especially
the Fed) has little stake in POS as a user, compared to its very considerable interest in ACH as
the operator of the clearing mechanism. Moreover, ACH operates in a batch mode, while POS is
almost entirely real-time. The Fed and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board have both already
declined industry invitations to become the operator of a POS switch. Id. at 71-72.
211 Welfare recipients, for example, are especially vulnerable. With DDP and PAD, it could
truly be the case that the recipient's account is only a way-station from the government to the
[Vol. 2:397
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The wealth-distribution and systems management activities of
governments cannot be left out of the analysis if they exist in the
reality of a mixed economy.
Cost savings to the federal government are not the major impetus
for the development of EFTS. Neither is the cost of processing checks
the central motivation of banks to adopt EFTS. 210  A more immediate
motivation is the prospective profit to be gained from changes in the
relevant consumer markets.2 1' If any component of EFTS (e.g.,
ACH/DDP or PAD or POS) becomes widely accepted, it is most
probable that all of its users will need to maintain a demand deposit
account: a "cash card" could hardly operate otherwise; so too with a
tape-initiated payroll credit system. Thus the system's initiators stand
to capture a larger share of undercompensated demand deposits, ei-
ther through the positive attraction of the system to some consumers
or through a need to participate on the part of others. And, to the
extent that a broad scale EFTS/POS system can be created, there may
tend to be an economy of specialization and therefore a concentra-
tion, in the hands of its operators, of related salable functions still
peripheral to the traditions of retail banking: consumer credit, credit
analysis, retail inventory and other managerial-accounting functions,
and the like.212
utility company. The analogy of the company store suggests itself.
Consider, as a tangential point, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), a case in which a
group of tenant farmers sought to challenge a regulation issued by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Prior to the regulation, the farmers were not permitted to assign their upland cotton program
payments to their landlords. The proposed regulation changed that. One might ask why the
farmers wanted not to have the power freely to assign their income. The answer seems clear: the
pressure from landlords to do so would be inescapable. And although the debts owed the
landlords were legitimate and, had the tenants stayed in one place long enough, their collection
would have been had, the power of assignment would have assured collection in every case.
With the ban on assignment, the tenants retained at a minimum the possibility of buying a bus
ticket out. Baxter, Cootner & Scott might regard that-the ability to use a "second economy" to
escape suffocating though lawful indebtedness-as a bad thing. Maybe it is. But maybe society
needs escape valves too.
20 Though this has been one factor among others. Recall the 98% cost reduction coming from
the 50:1 ratio of storage costs for checks vs. magnetic tape memory, page 434 supra.
21. NCEFT INTEMM, supra note 3, at 59.
212 See, e.g., NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 37 ("[Large commercial banks] hope to extend their
shares of market in commercial banking and to extend commercial banking's share of the market
in other activities authorized under the Bank Holding Company Acts."); note 182 supra. A
somewhat less complimentary view of all this was offered by the representative of a very large
national bank, who served as that bank's delegate to various EFTS committees (and who has
requested anonymity for himself and his bank):
It was harder for management, based on long and short term profit goals, not to
do something new because the competition might and they would always have the
sneaking suspicion they should have. This phenomenon I refer to as bankers' para-
noia. . . .[I]t was further emphasized by a Canadian banker we met who said that
'sometimes we banks like to slash our wrists and lie down and bleed together.'
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Given even this rough overview of some participants and their
incentives, we are better able to consider what the various likely
futures are for competition in the payments market. The theory is a
simple one: if there are economies of scale to EFTS implementation-
which there are 2 3 -then there should be a reflection of those econo-
mies not only in the internal competitiveness of EFTS producers, but
more pointedly in the likelihood that a grid of nets will become
dominant among the various modes of payment. Imagine the pond
full of banks offering checking accounts, credit cards, cash handling,
some rudimentary ATM's. One bank, encouraged by unused computa-
tional capacity from its subsidized ACH operations, then expands its
niche or, simply on its own initiative, offers a combined system of
ATM and POS ("One card, cash and credit."). It is not likely to be a
small bank: a POS system has some minimal number of retail termi-
nals necessary in order for it to cover its costs. Signing on that number
of merchants takes time, as did instituting the bank-credit-card sys-
tem, during which the system operator will probably experience large
losses. 21 4
Personal correspondence. What this correspondent may have been referring to, of course, is the
fact that if EFTS can be implemented successfully, there will be profits for the innovators. All of
the other firms must then join in, not to make profits but to cut losses. See also NSF/RANN,
supra note 5, at 37: "Actions on the part of... 'aggressively forward looking' banks inevitably
have caused concern, not only by their direct commercial competitors, but also by other
financial industry organizations who fear the eventual impact on their own markets. So these
organizations, in turn, begin to express interest and take initiatives." Ample evidence for exactly
that proposition appears in the hearings on the EFTS Moratorium bill-legislation sponsored by
the credit union industry among others, afraid, perhaps, of the competitive advantage already
secured by the savings and loan associations. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 245, supra note 208, at
11-12 (Statement of Herman Nickerson, Jr., Administrator, National Credit Union Administra-
tion):
S. 245 reflects a desire to avoid . . . inequitable developments in the field of elec-
tronic funds transfer (EFT).
• . . There is no need to discontinue the development of EFT, but there is a real need
to see that its rapid growth does not adversely affect . . . those competing financial
institutions committed to serving the public.
213 See note 212 supra.
"' There is much debate about the internal cost curves of EFT systems, with Baxter, Cootner
& Scott taking an optimistic view of the prospects of having an economical POS net in the very
near future. BC&S at 105. One other researcher, for example, concluded (on the basis of data no
more opaque than is Baxter, Cootner & Scott's "proprietary information") that at the present
time the volumes necessary to operate a profitable POS system make the risk of investing in a
large scale implementation so great that they are beyond what a "prudent businessman" should
undertake. See NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 96-97 (quoting a Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
study of point-of-sale EFT's regarding implementation and costs for the fourth district). The
NCEFT reached a similar conclusion in the area of POS costs, that "Under present conditions,
cost savings from use of POS systems appear to be some years in the future, in light of the large
transaction volumes required for successful implementation." NCEFT INTraM, supra note 3,
at 78 (emphasis added). See NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 101. The results, in other words, are not
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The experiment will either fail, or will cause a second major
change; it is unlikely that the situation can remain stable with one
bank running a viable POS net. Assuming, as Baxter, Cootner and
Scott do, that higher income depositors will more readily use the POS
system, 21 5 other banks will see themselves at risk of losing large un-
dercompensated deposits. The risk is greater still, since a POS retailer
incurs a transaction-cost advantage in moving its demand accounts to
the net operator as wel121 6 -not to mention the advantage the innova-
tor has in offering DDP services to its retailing customers. Other banks
in the market area will inaugurate EFT services of their own, both to
reduce the migration of demand deposits and because the POS re-
tailers already enrolled will reduce the costs of entry to any second
bank whose card and communication system is compatible with the
first.
The second plateau on the way to the new equilibrium, there-
fore, will be one in which most of the banks in the market are actively
participating in two payments systems-checks and EFTS-and re-
tailers are offering both-cash-checks, and credit-cash card-to their
customers.
This too is an unstable circumstance. Electronic systems, while
easily compatible with other electronic systems, are not entirely so
with systems in which paper is regarded as real. An operating EFT
system and a check system both have fixed operating costs that cannot
be merged into one or the other. Those banks, therefore, that entered
the EFT net to protect their deposits may find themselves earning
yet in, and the magnitudes of the transaction volumes at stake vary from one commentator to the
next. D.W. Hock (president of the then Bank Americard system) comes closest to Baxter,
Cootner & Scott. He reports that Bank Americard's Base II system can operate efficiently on less
than 1% of present national check clearing volumes. Hock, EFTS or EVE, 13 FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF BOSTON CONFERENCE SERIES 65, 73 (1974). All such predictions, however, should be
liberally salted. One, which the reader may assess for himself, was made in a slightly different
context: "It seems clear that there is no way checks will survive the introduction of credit cards.
From the point of view of the banks it is commercial folly to operate two distinct clearing
systems, check and credit card, side by side." T. RUSSELL, THE ECONOMICS OF BANK CREDIT
CARDS 38 (1975). Sometimes they just take longer to come true.
So far as processing costs are concerned, ACH's at least are critically volume-sensitive. The
Atlanta Payments Project concluded that ACH's had no processing cost advantages unless the
equipment was operating at nearly full volume-in that case, about 25,000 items per hour
continuously. NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 321.
2'5 Either because their time costs are higher or because their greater discretionary wealth
permits some looser degree of management.
"6 This will be less true if ACH works as it someday might. The advantage now is that POS
credits can be available for withdrawal instantly (or can earn interest immediately) upon their
deposit, without needing any transfer from the POS-credit account to, e.g., the payroll account
at some other bank. The advantage of doing all one's banking at a single place may decline if
interbank transfers really do become fully electronic.
1981]
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lower net profits than before. Unless the mere fact of EFT causes an
expansion of the market's deposit base, the whole industry will be in
that position, wondering how it thought the revenues from EFT-ophi-
lic deposits would cover the costs of development. 217 This may be one
reason why it will all never happen. Assume, however, that it goes
that far: the majority 218 of banks are tied into a two-way process; the
merchants, three (including cash). Now what?
As Baxter, Cootner and Scott are themselves aware, the emer-
gence of a viable POS network does some interesting things to the
remaining check system, besides just multiplying many-fold its proc-
essing costs per item or dollar handled. They say, for example, that as
debit (POS) cards become more common, the adverse character of
checks as short-term credit devices will become more obvious, so that
the costs of using checks will rise to include this differential credit cost
component 219-or will otherwise make the providing of a checking
service quite a different thing from what it used to be.
Similarly, as debit card use increases so will the default risk of the
remaining checks, since floaters and bouncers are more likely than
other people to prefer checks to instantaneous debit systems. Mer-
chants will, therefore, seek to discourage check writing: "Under the
postulated conditions the merchant may not accept checks at all or
may accept them only for a significant fee." 220  Or if differentiation
217 This is precisely the scenario independently arrived at by my colleague Peter Schuck, who
sees these competitive pressures leading, in a market left entirely alone, to an EFT system too
little used to be efficient and a paper-based system whose costs per transaction rise because its
volume declines (with large fixed costs) and which must then bear only the most expensive subset
of all of its prior transactions. See Schuck, supra note 74, at 162 n.35.
2" The prospective deposit (and therefore revenue) losses may vary with the demographic
characteristics of any one bank's clientele. For the sake of illustration, assume that the correla-
tion of wealth with acceptability of EFTS is very high. In that case, if banks draw their
depositors from a restricted geographic area, and if (as is often the case) the wealth categories
within geographical districts are homogeneous, then it could very well be the case that while
banks in affluent areas add EFTS services to forestall deposit losses, banks in the inner-city feel
far less threatened by the innovation. All of these assumptions, however, are quite restrictive.
Thus, while there may be some of the postulated effect, in practice it is not likely to be as sharply
observable as the example might suggest.
21. This does not mean that there will be two sets of prices. (What is far more likely is that the
more costly system will simply be disallowed in many cases.) Price differentiation has high
transactions costs. Personal observation of an allied phenomenon bear this out. The Fair Credit
Billing Act, § 167, has made it unlawful for banks to forbid merchants to allow discounts for
cash (as opposed to credit card) sales. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(f) (1976). Nevertheless, merchants
infrequently make differentiated prices available to their customers. And in this case the stakes
are fairly high-two to five percent of the sale. The same distinction between POS and checks so
far as credit costs are concerned (a few days' float time) probably doesn't exceed three ten-thou-
sandths of the price.
10 BC&S at 59.
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within one retail store becomes too costly-another phenomenon to
be concerned with-in a world where not all merchants take all debit
cards the remaining fraud and credit risks would shift to merchants
who do not have debit card terminals.2 2' That may in turn result
either in higher costs for goods purchased in less affluent areas222 or,
because of this disadvantage, in the elimination of no-terminal stores
either by their demise or their purchase of POS terminals. All in all,
this can result in a reduced acceptability of non-POS payment
methods and a push on the feedback loop-a contribution to that
critical degree of POS penetration that may make these discontinuities
less and less resistible.
A similar analysis can be applied to the viability, for all but
trivial transfers, of cash. Consider the costs to a retail store of accept-
ing cash. Some of the costs, such as the maximum amount that can be
stolen or embezzled by employees, vary smoothly with the amount of
cash on hand. Other costs, however, do not; one cannot purchase such
safeguards as strongboxes, safes and alarm systems in infinitely divisi-
ble units. The costs of handling the cash (cash drawers, transporting
the cash to a deposit point) are also "lumpy." The analogy of fixed and
variable costs suggests itself: to accept cash at all means to have
certain irreducibly fixed costs. Conversely, to give up some few sales
by refusing to accept a small residual number of cash transactions may
result in disproportionate savings. 223  The point at which a retailer
might therefore exact a "penalty" from cash users, or else refuse to
deal in cash at all, 224 may not be predictable for all cases in advance,
but it is a very likely phenomenon. 225
221 Id. at 60.
222 Where no-terminal stores are more likely to be. As Baxter, Cootner & Scott observe,
"Checks should ultimately be restricted to transactions which cannot be effected on a terminal:
payments sent by mail and purchases at smaller establishments." Id. at 68-69.
223 See NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 50.
224 Nothing in our present law would forbid retailers to refuse to accept currency. Federal
statutes which make cash "legal tender" affect only the requirement that it be taken in payment
of debts, i.e., in payment of some previously extant contract. See 31 U.S.C. § 452 (1976). One is
free, however, to contract ab initio for another form of payment, and if that is done the legal
tender laws have no application. See Bronson v. Bodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229, 251-54 (1868)
(where contract expressly required payment in coined dollars, creditor could not be compelled to
accept United States notes even though a federal statute made the notes legal tender in payment
of all public and private debts; such contracts are not "debts" within the statutory meaning). Cf.
Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Morrison, 19 Fed. Cas. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1864) (No. 11,089) (ground
rents are not debts within meaning of federal statute providing that United States notes are legal
tender in payment of all debts); Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 318, 350 (1862) (state taxes are not
debts within meaning of federal statute making United States notes legal tender in payment of all
debts; statutory debts are confined to sums of money due under contract).
25 There already are gasoline stations that refuse to accept any cash at all after 6 p.m.
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Similar artifacts of lumpy costs affect other aspects of EFTS.
Tape-initiated credit flows, for example, may be profitable only if
they virtually eliminate other systems. Likewise for PAD process-
ing.2 26 Again there is a discontinuity-the very large advantage to be
derived by eliminating redundant fixed costs.
Two other phenomena may tend toward the same direction, viz.
toward eliminating competing payment systems once EFTS achieves a
critical degree of penetration. One is the economy of specialization:
billing and credit operations, now done in many scattered retail loca-
tions, may become uneconomic compared to purchased services, 227
with the seller able to utilize expertise and other scale economies, as
well as the very considerable collection leverage that comes from
having debits and credits in the same set of hands. Thus, although this
point may not require a total elimination of cash, it does suggest that a
vertical concentration of functions in the hands of the system operator
is not unlikely. 228
When all is said and done, this amounts to a series of observations
that go against the grain of Baxter, Cootner and Scott's soothing
assurance that EFTS will only be one system among others. They
arrived at that conclusion, it seems, by investing an enormous amount
of confidence in a painfully simple model of consumer preference and
producer response. The model is barely chiaroscuro; the world is
psychedelic polychrome.
VI. THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEUTRAL SCIENCE
In the heuristic genre of which the Baxter, Cootner and Scott
report is an instance, markets are not just good things. They are, to
misquote the words of Vincent Lombardi, the only thing. The inputs
to a market are consumer preference and social resources. The outputs
are maximal satisfaction of consumer demand and the efficient alloca-
2. BRAND, GRUBER, STANDER & Co., supra note 78, at 30, 49.
... An interesting test of this general point can be suggested, beginning with an analogy to the
effect of credit cards on the use of store-generated credit accounts. Consider a customer who has
both a bank credit card and the possibility of acquiring a store card. If the store accepts both,
one might inquire into what the distribution of credit risks would be. It could be guessed, for
example, that bank card holders will bother to acquire store cards only if their bank card credit
lines are too low or have been exhausted. When that is true, the local store account undertakes to
do the marginal "excess" lending. The effect, then, is to unbalance the credit risks in such a way
that store cards bear more of it. The economies of subsidization of credit from retail sales,
already perturbed by the very existence of bank cards, take a very hard blow. Out goes the local
account and up goes the concentration of credit in bank card issuer's hands.
228 This was indeed one of the issues isolated for study in the NSF/RANN report. See NSF/
RANN, supra note 5, at 12.
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tion of resources dedicated to meeting that demand. The regulator,
collective consumer demand, is the sum effect of individual consumer
choices. Participation in the market and the expression of preferences
by consumers are the same act; markets, therefore, do not coerce in
the way that regulation by government does. If a market is working
reasonably well-that is, barring serious market failure caused by
government regulation or otherwise-all legitimate concerns of con-
sumers about EFTS will of necessity be accounted for. If there are
dimensions which consumers dislike, such as the risks to privacy, their
failure to use the service will result in its change-the deletion of the
objectionable features for those willing to pay the new price. So long
as the market does all this, responding to the pluses-time and con-
venience-and the minuses-the instrumental consequences of losses
of privacy-to consumers of this proposed evolution in the payments
process, regulation by some nonmarket force will do nothing but
perturb the optimal set of outputs. EFTS, so far as consumer issues are
concerned, should be left alone. 22
This affective commitment to the market is, if not an ideological
choice, at least a methodological one. It places the burden of proof on
the proponents of regulation by government; if the burden is not met,
the policy recommendation must be to let the market decide. Markets
and politics do not begin the race evenly. The justification for casting
the burden in that way comes, inevitably, from a confidence that the
model of market performance is descriptively correct. Hence the nor-
mative content of the neutral science. A closer look at the model in the
context of EFTS suggests that the burden is unfairly cast.
A. A Narrowed Gaze
The easy transition from the application of a model to the pos-
tulation of a policy requires that the model consider all of the things
that social regulation might wish to embrace. Baxter, Cootner and
Scott's model does nothing of the kind. It focuses on a single kind of
output 230 and counts as costs and benefits only those things that can
229 Some of this is obviously caricature, though not by much. Some of it is only implicit in
Baxter, Cootner & Scott, though again not hidden by much-the authors were not always
explicit about their methodological predicates, as I have previously suggested, see page 451
supra. The stated conclusion, however, is neither implicit nor caricature. "Private EFT systems
are voluntary and nonexclusive systems, so consumer preference will play a powerful role in
forming their practices as to information gathering and access." BC&S at 174. And, "The
benefits to consumers from unfettered development of EFTS in banking far outweigh its associ-
ated risks ...." Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
231 See text accompanying note 233 infra.
1981]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Cardozo L. Rev.  465 1980 - 1981
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
somehow be translated into a single currency. An example or two
might illustrate the texture that this omits.
As the authors themselves say, it will not be possible in the near
future to have POS terminals at every retail point of sale. 23' The
hardware cost alone will initially restrict installations to retail outlets
with large unit sales and gross revenues. If it is true that POS is seen
by consumers as a valuable shopping economy, and if it reduces the
net costs of retailing, then it is not unlikely that smaller stores would
be competitively handicapped by the ability of larger stores more
profitably to employ POS terminals. 23 2  To state the same thing an-
other way, the cost effects of POS technology may increase the mini-
mum efficient size of retail firms by introducing a further economy of
scale.
There may be some matters worth worrying about here: even if
society would on the whole be functionally better off if it had a more
efficient retail process, there are uncompensated internal redistribu-
tions of the kind that might concern policymakers. Existing small-
store entrepreneurs may find themselves displaced; putative small-
business entrepreneurs may face higher entry barriers in the form of
larger minimum capital necessary to become an "owner." These are
losses in human satisfaction as well as being social perturbations. 233
They are not easily assessed by a model which counts only efficient
output on its measuring stick.
Likewise on the consuming side. POS technology will encourage
the further development of centralized billing and credit systems,
with concomitant changes likely in the cost and availability of
credit,'2 34 perhaps most notably in its individuation.2 35  Consider, too,
the fact of income disparity and the clientele history of retail banking:
Will the poor have equal access to POS accounts and to retailers with
23 See BC&S at 63, 68.
232 See NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 119.
233 Baxter, Cootner & Scott work right up to but do not see this problem, almost as if to prove
the case being made here. One particularly interesting passage, dealing with the reduction in
branches that ATM's may make necessary-whole banks, in unit banking states-is this:
One way to reduce the number of banks is through bank failure. These words still
convey a rather special sense of catastrophe and disaster, derived from the Great
Depression and the Bank Holiday of 1933. . . . If bank office reduction took this
form, the overwhelming preponderance of failures would be of small banks in unit
banking states, and there can be no question of the adequacy of the deposit insurance
fund to deal with that type of situation. Despite the fact that the subject is still
somewhat emotionally charged, exit by failure of the firm is not really an unthink-
able way of reducing excess capacity in banking.
BC&S at 178 (footnote omitted).
... NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 90, 199, 201.
23 A concept I have discussed elsewhere. See Dauer, supra note 116, at 155.
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POS capability? If not, they will be disadvantaged again with respect
to more affluent EFT users.
If left to itself, EFTS might well have these and other distributive
implications. They are not the sorts of things (e.g., the values of access
to entrepreneurship, to individuated service and credit, and to nonre-
gressive consumption costs) for which a market will effectively cor-
rect. The classical market model does not see these losses as necessarily
being incorrect .236
A final example bridges two critiques: it is an example of market
failure as well as an instance of values "irrelevant" to an efficiency
process. Markets work on the basis of bids. "Efficient allocation" itself
means a set of arrangements that optimally deploy resources as that is
measured by consumers' willingness to pay. 237  This ignores the fact of
disparate and constrained wealth.
If for example A is about to impose a cost on B, some market
theorists would say that A will internalize that cost even without a
rule of legal liability, by foregoing the bribe that B would pay him not
to cause the harm.2 38  Fair enough. But suppose that what B wants to
protect is a value of an illiquid sort. Protecting it will not generate a
revenue that will pay the cost of the bribe. And suppose that, for one
reason or another, B has no liquid assets that can be devoted to the
purpose. Can a market work without bids? Or are markets efficient
preservers of only those values that are either held by owners with
sufficient discretionary wealth to buy their protection or that are
themselves transferable utilities that others will value? An analysis of
how the market will adjust might not direct one's attention to whether
it can adjust for a nonmarketable sensibility. To take the point closer
to home, physiological sustenance is usually more important than
existential and psychological serenity. "Buying out" of EFTS is there-
fore a luxury239 for one who faces a foreclosure of his other options.
And if powerlessness in general is inversely related to wealth, those
2 3 A model that does not include a well-stated theory of social distribution goes even further:
it would assert that allocating higher costs to higher-risk-often, lower income-groups is
efficient and therefore correct.
21 See R. PosNER, supra note 159, at 10-11.
236 Absent transactions costs, to be sure. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
EcoN. 1, 15-16 (1960).
230 Availability is functionally related to increased cost. Thus, for example, if checks come to
be acceptable only if a 25 cent fee (for the increased fraud and credit risks, see page 462 supra)
were added, less affluent individuals might not be able to afford the choice of checks over EFTS.
For them, the availability of alternatives has dropped considerably. As to the ascription of
..cause" in this regard, i.e., whether a 25 cent fee should be assessed against the check user
because of that individual's desire to deviate from the least-cost norm, see my discussion in
Dauer, supra note 116, at 135 nn.10 & 11.
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demographic strata with the least reserves of autonomy have the least
chance to avoid the most "efficient" financial systems.
An analysis that begins with a descriptively incomplete model is
not likely to consider important those things the model elides.
B. Consumer Markets
Not only is the market-model narrow in the sense that as a
heuristic device it fails to wrap the analysis around all of the relevant
issues, it is descriptively questionable as well.
A market economy produces a hundred kinds of applesauce and a
thousand brands of mouthwash. If production decisions were left
entirely to some well-intentioned central planner there might not be
lemon-scented, puce-colored soap balls in the shape of rose buds. (Or
there might be only those.) Concomitantly, it is a freely functioning
and competitive market that normally eliminates, with minimum
waste, expenditures for the production of goods (like Edsel automo-
biles) that people do not want. But it is a long leap from these and
similar observations to the conclusion that consumer sovereignty is
unvaryingly effective. Banking is not like soap making; payment sys-
tems are not like cars. 240  Even when it does work, consumer sover-
eignty can be a crude device. When uniformity has significant cost
advantages to producers, for example, consumer markets are often
unable to regulate producers and production except in very gross
ways, or to discriminate finely among the various individual elements
that combine to form aggregate consumer demand.24'
The National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers reached
this very conclusion when it "recognized that social and economic
pressure to conform and accept an unwanted service might be over-
whelming 242 in the near future of EFT. When considering, for exam-
ple, the allocation of liabilities for theft, error and EFT system mal-
function, "the Commission viewed as unequal the bargaining power
between EFT providers and . . . [individual] customers, and there-
fore rejected private contract [in favor of federal legislation] as an
appropriate vehicle for establishing these rights and liabilities.- 243
24O But see note 245 infra.
241 See discussion at pages 452-53 supra, and my earlier discussion in Dauer, supra note 116,
at 130-36.
Markets that suffer high discrimination costs treat aggregate consumer preferences in the
way that least common denominators treat fractions. If we have 1/8, 1/6, 1/24, 1/24, 1/24, 1/2,
treating the whole as composed of 24ths is not too bad. But calling all the components 24ths
doesn't work quite as well when the members of the group are only 1/3, 1/4, 1/6, 1/8 and 1/2,
242 NCEFT FINAL, supra note 3, at 41-42.
243 Id. at 55.
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That is to say, not every issue is equally susceptible to resolution by
fine-tuned consumer marketplace choices. Some are, but some
aren't .244
For one thing, manifest consumer preferences in the market yield
neither individually nor socially optimal results if the choosers are
unable to make intelligent comparisons of available alternatives. With
respect to banking transactions generally there is a "pervasive eco-
nomic illiteracy. " 245 This illiteracy goes further than a mere unfamil-
iarity with the whys and wherefores of retail banking and the law and
custom that govern its several modes. It is a species of ignorance-
wholly understandable and forgivable-that goes to a misunderstand-
2'4 As the NCEFT again recognized. In discussing the need for maintaining consumer choice
among payments systems, for example, the Commission recommended that it be made unlawful
for a lender to condition the granting of consumer credit on the consumer's agreement to PAD
repayment; and that (more understandably) with respect to DDP, the individual worker should
be permitted freely to choose the depository institution. Id. at 42. However, no such recommen-
dations (e.g., accepting only certain forms of payment) were made with respect to merchants
because, inter alia, there will be among merchants "corrective market forces." Id. at 43-44. Why
among merchants, but not among lenders? And even with respect to banking institutions, the
Commission felt that privacy matters should, in the main, be regulated-unwaivably--by
legislation, id. at 36; but that questions of "stop-payment" rights can be left to be resolved by the
market. Id. at 9. Unless the Commission was being entirely disingenuous-such that "leave it to
the market" means a "pro-bank solution is acceptable"--it must have concluded that, realisti-
cally speaking, markets work with respect to some issues and not others, and with respect to
some kinds of firms but not others. The choice is empirical. See page 477 infra.
245 NCEFT INTmM, supra note 3, at 8 (quoting Richard J. Francis, Commissioner, Michigan
Financial Institutions). Ignorance has, of course, several dimensions, some immediate and some
remote. Thus, one commentator analogized the problem of consumer choice in EFTS to that of
automobiles:
[F]ew of [the social costs] were forseen either by the promotors of the automobile or
by its consumers. Had they been forseen, the technology might have taken a radi-
cally different form, or alternatives to the automobile might have been preserved
and developed or both. In their roles as taxpayers, consumers, and voters a more
clairvoyant American people might well have insisted upon controlling and human-
izing the automobile before the technology had become economically, politically,
and socially institutionalized-in short, before it became too late.
Schuck, supra note 74, at 151-52.
The most cogent analysis thus far of the relationship between the problem of imperfect
information and the remedy of legal intervention, appears in Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 630 (1979). Schwartz and Wilde conclude that the preferable solution for noncompetitive
market behavior is not term regulation, but intervention by legislative and administrative, not
judicial, agents to attempt to increase competition in the market. Id. at 682. Their research has
suggested to them that markets will behave competitively even if a majority of consumers are
ignorant, so long as a substantial minority are informed. Their work, however, is thus far
restricted to the case of homogenous goods and ignorance about alternative prices. It is extraordi-
narily difficult, I believe, to move their theories over to the case of choices about nonhomogenous
alternatives offered at different prices. Their continued research should be interesting to watch.
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ing of the remote, future and wider consequences of the single simple
choice.
The present can never be a perfectly discounted future. Some-
times, as is the case for EFTS, the core of a rolling snowball is made of
very different stuff than that which later adheres to it. EFTS machin-
ery will at first be a gadget-an optional toy, even an interesting
convenience-to be used or not used entirely at will, a benign nov-
elty, hardly a patent threat to anything. At the outset EFTS may
indeed increase consumer choice. z 6
But choices made on the basis of a present seemingly uncon-
nected to a very different future may bring that future on. As Profes-
sor Rule has argued, faith in the tenet that the market will decide-
that if consumers do not want EFT it will not come into
being-confuses two different kinds of decisionmaking. A consumer's
most immediate decision is often a response to what is the only man-
ageable question: "Will this serve my purpose at this time?" That issue
is very different from: "If I and everyone else do it, will it create a
system with implications that will injure some other interests at some
future time?" Many persons, Rule points out, continue to use their
22" This was the explicit conclusion of the National Science Foundation research group, i.e.,
that while EFTS will increase consumer choice in the short term, in the long run it may not:
lower socioeconomic status groups will likely be pressured into using things like DDP and PAD
for rent and loan repayments. NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 212. These pressures could later on
come to affect higher socioeconomic status groups. Id. Competition among payments system
operators can cure this contraction of choice only when the costs of entry are low, which, in
many versions of the EFTS future, they are not.
Another point tending in the same direction, though, I believe, a somewhat less persuasive
one, is that
[e]ven if benefits are provided to the consumer to participate in a new system, he
may well have questions as to whether these benefits will continue once the new
system is operating. At that time, when he may have no other alternatives, the rules
of the game may be changed; and he has no confidence that a sufficiently strong
spokesman will be available to protect his interests.
NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 85.
Once EFT is underway, in place and operating-albeit, for lack of volume, at a loss-the
nature of the remaining "choices" may change drastically. There is some critical degree of
penetration, probably unknowable in advance but clearly less than the point of financially
optimal usage, at which it will become possible for payments-makers (governments, employers,
dividend-granting corporations) and payments-takers (utility companies, lenders, landlords) to
insist upon dealing in a single form of payment. Prior to that point the adverse reaction of
consumers would be intolerable; after that point the numbers of individuals and the alternatives
open to them will have declined to the point at which "coercion" of this gentle kind becomes
entirely possible. See discussion at pages 460-63 supra; NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 194-95.
The critical juncture will vary, of course, for each good and service, coming later for luxuries
than for necessities, and earlier for institutions with larger degrees of market power and for those
whose payments processes are consciously paralleled by their competitors. Thus, some day, one
may either need a debit card, or be left out. See generally M. WESSEL, supra note 137, at 21-22
(regarding access to credit card system).
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private automobiles while wishing that an earlier policy decision had
been made which would have made it possible now to get along
without them.2 47 The two kinds of decisionmaking are fundamen-
tally different: One "addresses the question of what sort of social
world is to be sought; the second is ... how to deal in one's own right
with the world as it is, like it or not.-2 48 Information sufficient to
determine the present, immediate issue is typically much easier to
come by than is the prescience needed to determine the other.
Even if any one (or every) individual is capable of accurately
discounting the future to the present and foreseeing the causal links
between them, the sum of atomistic choices may still not faithfully
reflect the "real" social preference. The process of choosing is then a
classic prisoner's dilemma: "If no one does it, we will all be better off;
but if others do it, I am less badly off if I do it too." EFTS (or other
payment systems) demand uniformity of format, access, and-to a
very great degree-operation. The individual calculus, facing such
problems of scale, is a serious distortion of the social. Baxter, Cootner
and Scott, on the other hand, seem to begin with the contrary proposi-
tion as a fundamental though unexpressed definition: optimal collec-
tive choice is equal to collected atomistic choice.
Charles Lindblom hit it precisely:
Voting puts the selection of an official on every voter's agenda. The
voter recognizes the problem and deals with it deliberately. Buying
puts the allocation of resources into every buyer's hands. But he
does not necessarily know it. He need not know that his purchases
affect resource allocation, certainly Aeed not feel any responsibility
to deliberate on resource allocation before he decides what to buy.
He participates in.. an interaction that solves the problem of re-
source allocation as a by-product or epiphenomenon of his own
private problem solving.
[Thus] the design of a city may be left to emerge as a by-prod-
uct-that is, epiphenomenally- from individual decisions on land
use. 
249
Neither should one expect there to be much active consumer
involvement in the planning of longer-range consumer affairs. The
individual consumer's interest in most things, even important ones, is
generally of a low intensity simply because it is so diffuse: everyone is
247 J. RULE, supra note 20, at 41-43.
248 Hence another fortification for the choice of decisionmaking through legislation (with its
collective information channels) rather than through markets (with their inefficient long-range
information submarket).
214 C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 257 (1977).
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a consumer, and consuming is a large part of everything that one
does.2 50  Thus consumers as individuals tend to respond only to the
dramatic, pressing issues, and not to clamor about the long-range.2 51
The free-rider paradigm explains this phenomenon: since most of us
are producers in one area but consumers in many, we devote our
energies to issues that affect us as producers; otherwise we would
invest far more than we would gain. 25 2 This is simply a statement of
a familiar theory: since one's political capital is limited, each of us will
expend it on those things which affect us most specifically and
directly.
Avalanches nevertheless may come from unwatched snowballs.
There is, finally, a curious tendency on the part of some to place
too much weight on the usual meaning of the word "demand" when it
appears in the phrase, "consumer demand." Consumers do not get
what they demand; they very seldom "demand" anything. Consumers
either accept or reject things. There is a difference in degrees of
acceptance that may approach a difference in kind. At one end of the
continuum we have the purchase-even a queuing-up for the pur-
chase-of faddish items such as pet rocks. Those who bought them
accepted them at the prices charged. At the other end is the "accept-
ance" of emergency medical aid, or the acceptance of electricity and
subway rides at the fixed prices charged. On a parallel continuum we
have "information" at one end, psychological coercion at the other,
and most "advertising" somewhere in between. At some point on these
continua the identity of demand with acceptance breaks down, as
does the fragile equation of free choice with manipulation.
Baxter, Cootner and Scott are constrained by their method to see
consumer want as the motive force for the introduction of EFT serv-
ices. This does not jibe well with the observations of commentators
whose views are more directly empirical. "The EFT establishment
still tends to view customer satisfaction as a residual marketing ques-
tion." 253  Consumer wants, that is to say, play no instigative role;
EFTS is being motivated by other forces. Most observers agree that
consumer acceptance is the best that can be expected. The evidence
250 See M. NADEL, THE POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (1971).
21' Therefore, "there are likely to be instances when the perceived needs of the public differ
from its objective needs" because, inter alia, few members of the public can be specialists (or
even adept) in all of the relevant areas of consumerism. Id. at 236.
Another point is raised mostly by the active participation in ACH, DDP, etc., of govern-
ment: "In consumer protection, a citizen is likely to be misled by 'the symbolic uses of politics.'
... [T~he citizen is more likely to assume contentedly that the government must be doing
something about it." Id. (quoting M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964)).
252 Id. at 240.
21' Bus. WEEK, Apr. 18, 1977, at 80.
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has already been reviewed, 5 4 showing that consumers are neither
displeased with the present payment system nor, in the main, favor-
ably disposed toward the ones coming. EFTS' promoters seem not to
be particularly disturbed about that. Many believe that this "residual
marketing question" can be "overcome." The Monetary and Payments
System Planning Committee of the American Bankers Association
announced, for example, that "[t]hrough qualitative research, we
have identified certain areas of customer attitudes which must be
changed,2 55 as well as those areas of EFTS which show the least
"resistance" and therefore the most promising possibilities for con-
sumer "acceptance." This perception is widely shared by industry
spokesmen 256 and outside consultants. 257  It bespeaks a confidence in
the industry's ability to effect the necessary preference changes. 258 Its
message is clear: such inroads as EFTS will make (with the possible
exception of ATM's) will not be the result of consumer demand; they
will be the result of industry salesmanship. Again to quote Lindblom:
"Corporation executives also decide on the magnitude and character
of the massive attempt at public information and thought control that
goes by the name of public relations and commercial advertising. 259
254 See pages 420-24 supra; IV APP/GIT Phase III, supra note 6, at 172: "In the traditional
new product sense, the cash card does not appear to have great potential. There does not seem to
be strong interest in having this service, much less in having to pay for the privilege."
255 AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N. REPORT OF THE MARKETING TASK FORCE TO THE MONETARY AND
PAYMENTS SYSTEM PLANNING COMM. 2-4 (1971) (emphasis added).
256 See, e.g., 13 FEDERAL RESERvE'BANK OF BOSTON CONFERENCE SERIES 34-35 (1974) (com-
ments of R. Long, Director of ACT, Bank Administration Institute).
257 "[M]arket research reveals high consumer satisfaction with the current payment system.
Consequently, strong efforts will be required to convert customers from paper-based to electron-
ic systems." THE BANKERS' EFT HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 14.
258 There seems to have been a consensus among the seers, that EFTS is a 'manifest destiny,
due sometime in the 1990's. The A.D. Little analysts, for example, see the "ultimate penetration
date" being as early as 1992. NSF/RANN, supra note 5, at 90-93. M. BENDER, supra note 135, at
84, has EFTS well underway and eemingly irreversible. And from The N.Y. Times: "'We have
passed the point of no return,' said John J. Poppen, a vice president of Booz Allen & Hamilton,
management consultants. 'We are reaching for the forms of full implementation, like it or not.'
But he sees a final E.F.T. victory as much as a quarter century away." Flint, Quick Electronic
Banking Slowed by the Public's Habits and Fears, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
159 C. LINDBLOM, supra note 249, at 155. After an extended discussion Lindblom adds: "The
result is that, although people do not always do what leadership wants, they are incapable of
knowing and protecting their own interests." Id. at 219.
It may be appropriate here to make one brief comment about the very interesting philo-
sophical imbroglio present in much of the discussion about advertising and its regulation,
particularly in what has been styled "psychological advertising." For the sake of illustration
assume the extreme case: at some point in time, A prefers X to Y. Then by some form of magic an
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Consumer markets, in short, do not always conform to the model
the report seems to have adopted.26 0 One consequence is a reduced
confidence in the analysis as a whole. Another is the rejection, from a
policy point of view, of the entire burden of persuasion that it casts.
C. Two Mechanisms of Social Choice
There is, to mention it once again, a risk of a subtle equation of
the descriptive parameters of the Baxter, Cootner and Scott model
with the prescriptive agenda of social policy. At some points the
equation is even explicit. That is the burden of this entire review: if
some unrealistically skinny assumptions-about consumer behavior
and market performance, to be precise-mark the basic model from
outside agency causes A to reverse his preferences. Suppose further that A once regarded act Y as
wrongful. At the later time A reports that the gain he derived from the induced change exceeds
the loss from the intrusion, but before it occurred he would have reported to the contrary.
Should the desirability of Y be assigned proleptically? Or, is the intrusion by the outside agency
wrongful retrospectively, as it would be prospectively? I don't know.
There is a rabbinic maxim, used to jusify the ritual conversion of infants: "One may act for
a person in his absence to his advantage ...." KETHUBOTH, THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, at Folio
Ila (Heb.-Eng. ed. 1971) (Soncino Press). Its place in rabbinic philosophy is carefully controlled,
of course, so that its actual application is not so perverse, and it is a presumption that may be
rebutted (e.g., the child, upon reaching maturity, may reject the conversion). Id. But it does
raise the issue as to when one can traverse the preferred presumption-the presumption against
substitution of judgment. Consider:
The problems that EFTS developers have been having in getting marketplace sup-
port for their new systems is natural. They simply have not yet strengthened the
perceptions of the fears that cause people to move, nor weakened those that anchor
them in place.
13 FEDERAL REsEVE BANK OF BOSTON CONFRENCE SEaIEs 34 (1974) (remarks of R. Long,
Director of ACT, Bank Administration Institute).
What is mainly lacking [in achieving a comprehensive implementation of EFT
systems] is a clearly effective strategy for inducing consumer acceptance and utiliza-
tion of the electronic capacity ....
T. KLEINSCHMIT, supra note 1, at 15.
Note, also, the sanguine report that "strong promotion" can overcome the public's present
resistance to payments systems change, in THE BANKERS' EFT HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 18.
Moreover, "[B]anks should not hesitate to rely on creative marketing strategies similar to those
used by other industries to educate and motivate the consumer." Id. at 15. Unlike the situation
when a child reaches maturity (or perhaps like that situation) the early decisions regarding EFTS
may prove to be irrevocable. See discussion at pages 458-64 supra.
"60 There are other sources of imperfection in consumer markets that could be added to this
list. One, alluded to briefly here, is that of "externalities" in market-place choice, both as to costs
and benefits. A thorough catalogue appears in C. LINDBLOM, supra note 249, at 152, 200-21.
Banking, to boot, is not a competitive industry. It is a carefully controlled and regulated
industry. That is not Baxter's fault-indeed, I suspect he might have done it otherwise. But
concentration is a fact of banking life, making it legitimate to ask whether EFTS can be left
"unfettered" without a full deregulation of the industry.
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which the analysis proceeds to its pronouncements, there is reason to
doubt the comprehensiveness of the exercise. If the model departs
from reality in relevant ways, there is reason to doubt the wisdom of
the proposals the analysis offers. Before going to a final restatement of
that argument, however, it is appropriate to comment briefly on two
additional pieces of the analytical regime-two that might be urged
in response to the arguments offered thus far.
The first can be dismissed quickly. Baxter, Cootner and Scott did
not say this expressly; whether it is a reasonable implication or not the
student of their work can decide. It goes like this: issues which the
model of a competitive market does not illuminate, are not issues to
which public policy need respond. 26  That would have been, had it
been said, quite at odds with what law has always thought its prov-
ince to be. The values discussed here and lumped under the head of
"dignity" are things that in the usual course do not fare well in private
markets, not because they are not valued, but because their pres-
ervation is not something that can be achieved by atomistic consumer
choices in a setting of economic exchange, for all the reasons so far
advanced. It is precisely for the protection of these things that govern-
ment must accept the responsibility.
The second point is related to the first. It deals with the a priori
preference for market solutions that the balance of the analytical
structure seems either to require or invite. Implicit is a premise that
while market regulation is the sum of the behaviors of fully autono-
mous individuals, government is something distinct from that collec-
tivity-that its choices do not as accurately reflect individual prefer-
ences as do those of the market; 26 2 that government, in short, is
inherently coercive. As I have argued elsewhere, 26 3 the idea of "free-
dom" in a marketplace has its curious dimensions.
.6 The point seems, however, to be clearly implicit in the choice of the-heuristic model. See
note 159 supra.
212 In discussing the issue of rate regulation versus market-set pricing, the authors portray a
scenario of bumbling incompetence on the part of government regulators, a nearly comical
caricature that demonstrates their view of a regulatory analogue to "market failure." See BC&S
at 142-43.
263 See Dauer, supra note 116, at 134-35:
[Wie should not, in a world doomed to be imperfect, accept a priori Milton
Friedman's dictum that markets are more democratic than political institutions. The
rejection of that axiom leaves us free to view markets and legislatures as alternative
forms of collective decision-making. Permit me to "unpack" that just a bit.
Friedman's view is, essentially, that markets are based on unanimity-that no
one is coerced to abide by the decisions made by others. Political decisions, on the
other hand, are in their nature coercive-majorities vote for laws which, because
they are laws, minorities must obey. Therefore, Friedman concludes, substantive
1981]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Cardozo L. Rev.  475 1980 - 1981
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:397
For example, the permissible rates of exchange of labor (income)
for consumption (goods, services) are determined wholly by the collec-
tive choices of all of the other market participants. While one may
possibly, though not likely, forego purchasing any gasoline at all, once
he has determined or once it has become necessary for him to make
the purchase, the rate and the terms of the exchange are set not by his
own consumption, but by that of other purchasers. And, to extend the
point out toward a more general equilibrium, the price of gasoline is
affected by other people's demand for, say, refrigerators, if the pro-
duction of both requires a common input such as steel. I do not wish
to quarrel at present with the allocational claim that atomistic mar-
kets result in the "efficient" distribution of all resources-that all
goods find their way to the hands of their highest valuing users. I
believe that is true only within a tightly bound definitional system,
regulation of markets by the less democratic legislature is inherently suspect. Fried-
man's view is, in my opinion, subject to at least three criticisms. First, there are some
issues on which votes cannot be cast in marketplaces. If, for example, I would gain
satisfaction from seeing greater protection for members of other social or economic
classes, there is normally no practical way my vote can be cast in the market; since I
do not participate in the relevant market stratum, I cannot express a willingness to
incur, say, a slightly higher cost of credit in return for substantive protections for
very different groups of people. (And there are such things as vicarious and cross-
utilities.) Second, it is not always true that each individual may opt in or out of any
given market. Some goods (for many people, most goods) are indeed necessities, and
the prices paid for those goods are indeed determined by others. The cost of gasoline
to drivers of "efficient" automobiles is increased by the excess demand for the
common product generated by drivers of inefficient cars. A legislature could, follow-
ing a majority will, impose graduated consumption taxes to prevent the "wasters"
from imposing costs on the "savers." On the other hand, a market leaves the wasters
freer and the savers more bound. I see no reason to prefer one solution over the other
a priori.
Third, Friedman might be correct if markets were perfect, but they are not.
The costs to sellers of finely differentiating among their buyers often exceeds the
revenues lost by not differentiating quite so much. Thus consumers are "averaged"
into lumps. To purchase individual attention or customized goods, services, or-es-
pecially-contract terms, is often impractical. Thus, for example, a creditor may
have only one policy about post-default remedies and one attendant price. The
deviant individual, who would prefer a different risk-cost mixture, "may not be able
to purchase it: The costs to the seller of dealing individually would be extraordinary.
Thus private bureaucracies have an impetus to adopt some optimal amount of
inflexibility. The characteristics of the market-segment group control the opportuni-
ties of the individual. Thus do imperfect markets coerce, just as do imperfect
legislatures.
Given this, it seems reasonable to reject the burden of persuasion which Fried-
man's hypothesis would force on the substantive regulator. A market is one integra-
tive way for us to allocate values; a political system is another. When we should
prefer one to the other is still an open question, the answer to which may vary from
case to case.
(footnotes omitted).
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from which the dictum too often escapes. The present point is a
sharper one. It is quite wrong to say that markets wholly preserve
individual freedom while political institutions wholly constrain it.
Both markets and legislatures are mechanisms for exercising collective
choice. It may be that for some purposes (allocative efficiency) mar-
kets are to be preferred, while for other purposes (redistribution and
the expression of altruistic cross-utilities) legislatures are.264 It is more
correct to say that markets can respond better to individual choice as
to some goods (stocks and bonds) than they can to others (police and
fire services, social welfare); or that legislatures can, through the
processes of democratic representation, effect choices on the basis of
information richer than (or at least different from) that possessed by
the economically most significant market participants.
This is not to say that legislative activity is to be preferred when-
ever any imperfection in the market presents itself. It is only to suggest
that there is no intrinsic moral or autonomy-preserving superiority in
the use of markets rather than legislatures. The differences are wholly
empirical. Sometimes autonomy is better preserved when an area of
interactive life is left to a market; sometimes, when it is left to a
legislature. Neither process is perfect, both have flaws, and-most
notable of all-both are inherently coercive at different times. Be-
cause of these empirical differences, we can minimize the total
amount of coercion present in social and economic life only if we are
prepared to use some optimal combination of collective-choice strate-
gies-if, that is to say, we do not unjustifiably cast an ideological
burden of persuasion on one of them. There is no coherent reason
always to prefer marketplace coercion to democratic coercion ab
initio. There is, of course, an inertia, combined wth an appearance:
unless there is some apparent consensus about goals and values as to
any particular question, it looks less intrusive (of the collectivity upon
2 Lindblom offers a related criterion:
[A] market system is a limited-use institution. Some tasks no market system can
attempt or achieve. In simplest and very rough form, the distinction between what
markets can and cannot do is this: For organized social life, people need the help of
others. In one set of circumstances, what they need from others they induce by
benefits offered. In other circumstances, what they need will not willingly be
provided and must be compelled. A market system can operate in the first set of
circumstances, but not in the second. Its limitation is conspicious when compared to
an authority system. Although authority is not required in the first set of circum-
stances, it can be used for both.
C. LINDBLOM, supra note 249, at 89 (footnote omitted). The most interesting feature of
Lindblom's entire work is that it intensifies the difficulty of choosing between markets and
politics when the occasion for choosing is the need to preserve one-person-one-vote rather than
one-dollar-one-vote. Large corporations, for example, occupy privileged positions in both mar-
ket and polyarchic systems. See id. at 152, 171-94.
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the individual) to do nothing-to let the "market" decide. But that is
not necessarily an optimal strategy in fact for the protection of indi-
vidual autonomy.
VII. A POSTSCRIPT ON MErHOD: CONCLUSIONS
There is much more to be said about electronic funds transfer
systems than what has been said here. There is more to the Baxter,
Cootner and Scott report than has been examined here: discussions of
branching and banking law, "sharing statutes" and antitrust, a
quiltwork of legal controls that EFTS confronts. Much of it is very
interesting and often illuminating work. This essay has focused selec-
tively on both the report and the subject of EFTS: The report, because
of what it omitted to say (consumer protection issues) and only a bit of
what it did (its very unsatisfying analysis of privacy and the preserva-
tion of choice); and electronic banking, because the burden of this
review has been not to comment on EFTS, but to comment on how
the policy issues of developments such as EFTS might be commented
upon. The report is an example of one such genre of policy analysis;
EFTS was the context in which its methodological structure could be
tested.
The results were not altogether happy. To review briefly, and to
relate the several strands of the discussion, the argument has been as
follows. The methodology implicit in the Baxter, Cootner and Scott
report is built upon two related descriptive models. One concerns the
preferences and behavior of consumers; the other, the behavior of
consumer markets. Between them was a derivative proposition: that
because consumers behave so as to maximize the satisfaction of their
preferences, and because markets are controlled by the collective
choices of individuals, markets will, if left unfettered, generally pro-
duce the greatest degree of consumer welfare possible. Of this, there
are two corrolaries: (1) Political solutions are (therefore) inferior to
and more coercive than market solutions; and (2) markets do not
impose artifacts of product development that are distasteful to any
substantial number of consumers. The net effect of this construct is to
build a very close nexus between its policy output-regulation of
EFTS by legislatures should be avoided-and its inputs-the descrip-
tive models of consumer and market behavior.
What the preceding pages have attempted to show is that both
models are descriptively questionable; both omit dimensions of indi-
vidual preference and institutional behavior that are important to any
comprehensive policy analysis of a matter such as EFTS. EFTS can
possibly traverse noneconomic values; those values are not validly
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expressed in marketplace choices; markets do not well account for or
consider them. A tightly bound analytical system will only include in
its catalogue of policy variables those things that work their way into
its queue of inputs. Policy analysts who, like Baxter, Cootner and
Scott, employ these methodological apparati ought, on issues such as
EFTS, to be more patently aware of the heuristic parochialism of
their system. The policy choices made necessary by a technological
future are too important to be left to modes of analysis that embrace
them incompletely.
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